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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Mubarak, 'Arafat To Outline Autonomy, Elections
93P40075A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
18 Dec 92 p 3

[Text] Cairo, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT—High-level diplomatic sources in Cairo have told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that Arab and Western capitals are currently making arrangements to hold a Palestinian-Israeli summit between Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin during the second quarter of next year. The sources indicated that this meeting will coincide with the beginning of the transitional phase of autonomy for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and following elections in the occupied territories. This is based on what Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres noted when he spoke of Rabin's readiness to meet with 'Arafat whenever the elections come to pass in these territories.

The sources said that Washington has begun its preparations—according to what it has told those Arab capitals concerned and those participating in the peace talks—to put forth a formula acceptable to both parties to the self-government. However, Washington has not explained these details, which allude to the possibility of realizing self-government gradually, so that the two sides do not reach an impasse.

The sources noted that talks between Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and 'Arafat in Cairo, which will take place at the beginning of next week, will comprehensively outline Palestinian preparations for holding elections in the occupied territories as well as the negotiating position vis-a-vis Israel after the conclusion of the eighth round [of talks] in Washington, and will also discuss the results of U.S. President George Bush's meeting with the Arab and Israeli delegations.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT has learned that it is expected that the Mubarak-'Arafat meeting will precede the fifth meeting of Egypt and the Arab cordons states, which will also be held in Cairo.

The sources noted that the Palestinian president has begun a new round of efforts with several Palestinian factions and organizations, with the aim of preparing for the next round of negotiations with Israel and mending the rifts in Palestinian internal relations.

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Prisoners Say Conditions Worsening After Strike
93AE0156A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 22 Nov 92 pp 10-11

[Article by Ayad 'Abd-al-Khaliq: "Intifadah For Freedom May Be Renewed"]

[Excerpts] Prison authorities have canceled some provisions of their agreement with the Prisoners' Committee and have ignored implementing others. They have not succeeded in requiring the prison guards to stop their harsh treatment. Therefore, the detainees are threatening to renew their suspended strike, which was comprehensive and was considered an "intifadah for freedom."

Three weeks ago, the Palestinian prisoners suspended their hunger strike, which had lasted 20 days (7 September-17 October) and which demanded improved detention conditions. The strike's suspension came after an agreement was concluded between a committee of prisoners and a committee appointed by the minister of police, Moshe Shahal.

The Israeli authorities have reverted to their previous barbaric policy. The statement issued by the prisoners in Qetziyot/Ansar 3 Prison, on 4 November 1992, in which they threatened to go back on strike and rekindle the "intifadah for freedom," made it clear that the management of the Israeli Prisons Department had reneged on their commitments, which were the basis for the prisoners' suspension of the strike.

The statement noted that the administration of that prison (which holds 4,700 Palestinians), had canceled visiting between the sections, in an attempt to extinguish the interaction of protest activities over detention conditions. This had prevented a prisoner from seeing his fellow prisoner and a son from seeing his father. In addition, the prison authorities use methods of collective punishment for the most trivial of reasons. Their practices are political, to silence the prisoners and prevent them from celebrating religious and national occasions. Medical care had deteriorated significantly, since there are a number of patients suffering from death agonies, which is worsened by the neglect and indifference of the medical team, which does not perform surgical operations nor dispense medicines to sick prisoners.

The statement cited the fact that the prison administration cut off hot water, which resulted in the spread of skin diseases. The quality of food rations was poor and insufficient to maintain physical health. In addition, it was controlled according to the guards' moods. Sometimes, the breakfast ration was given for lunch, with lunch becoming dinner. The administration refused to facilitate matters by allowing the prisoners out of their cells to bring food to the sections. Many times, this caused the prisoners to refuse to accept the rations.

In the statement, the prisoners said that provocative searches still continue, in which guards tear apart bags, searching through clothes. They also searched people in despicable ways during the monthly visits, sometimes reaching the disrobing stage. In addition, there was the humiliating way of counting, with the prisoners sitting for long periods of time outside, while heavily armed guards patrolled among the sections. The statement added that there were several forms of daily concerns because of the policy of procrastination in complying

with demands, such as replacing tents that do not protect against the heat in summer nor the cold in winter.

According to public statistics, there are about 4,700 Palestinian prisoners in the Ansar 35 [as published] Prison. However, the head of the International Red Cross mission in Tel Aviv said that there were 5,061 prisoners in 20 prisons, supervised by the Israeli Prisons Department, and 7,065 in six detention camps run by the Israeli Army. [passage omitted]

The prison authorities had agreed to extend the periods for relatives' visits, permitting the prisoners' fathers to join their sons, since that used to be prevented by the "iron grill;" to lengthen the daily recess period inside the prisons (al-Furah); stop the use of physical force against the prisoners; allow them to receive school and university education inside the prisons; provide medical assistance and perform surgical operations for those in need; improve the quality and quantity of food; permit communal prayer inside the prison sections; and to permit electrical appliances to be brought in, such as radios, televisions, and tape recorders. The Israeli committee also agreed to introduce improvements in the "isolation cell section" in al-Ramlah, which the prisoners—at that time—considered sufficient. Among these improvements were: two prisoners isolated in one cell, instead of one prisoner; improved quality of food; medical care provided as in the rest of the prisons; communal prayer permitted on Fridays, provided that this practice begin with groups of 10 worshippers, with this number gradually being increased; allowing televisions and heaters in each cell; stopping the use of physical violence against the prisoners; and, giving families the opportunity to visit them twice a month, instead of once.

Among the improvements that were introduced (the prison authorities reneged on them, as the statement of the Ansar 3 prisoners makes clear) was considering the Beersheba Prison, especially its isolation cell section, like the rest of the prisons, in which the prisoners could enjoy all rights that prisoners in other jails had. A library was to be opened and 1,000 books from the Junayd Prison transferred to it.

The Palestinian al-Haq human rights organization stated on 2 November 1992 that Palestinian prisoner Hasan Badr 'Abdallah Zubaydi (34) from the town of 'Anbata, who was recently released, suffers from a mental disease and has lost his memory and speech as a result of torture. He was unable to recognize his wife and four children, or even speak to them. Zubaydi was imprisoned at the end of September 1992 and released in late October. The family assured al-Haq that "he had been in excellent health and did not suffer from any disease." According to the report of one of the specialists, who is currently treating Zubaydi, he suffers from cataplexy. This is a psychological disorder accompanied by general convulsions. The affected person cannot speak, respond to others speaking to him, or react to outside stimuli.

Al-Haq believes that: "The physical or mental pressure to which Zubaydi was subjected during his detention and interrogation was the cause of the disease from which he now suffers." This belief stems from al-Haq's available data concerning the use of torture on a wide scale in Israeli interrogation centers.

Another Palestinian from the same town, Mustafa Barakat, died in Tulkaram detention camp last summer after 36 hours of detention.

Housing Council: 4,555 Requests for 1,300 Units

93P40076A Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 28 Nov 92 p 1

[Text] Jerusalem—The Palestinian Housing Council has disclosed the number of [housing] requests that have been allotted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and the number of requests that have been turned into the council. It notes a tangible decrease in the number of requests, indicating a deep understanding and awareness among the Palestinian masses.

In the Gaza Strip area, 2,648 requests were allocated; 490 in the Hebron area; 2,700 in the Jerusalem area, including Ramallah, Jericho and Bethlehem; and 1,700 in Nablus and the north (Jenin, Tulkarm and al-Qalqiliyah).

As for the number of requests turned in, the council received 1,622 from the Gaza Strip area; 316 from the Hebron area; 1,557 from the Jerusalem area; and 1,060 from the Nablus area.

Thus, a total of 7,537 requests were allocated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In total, 4,555 requests were received to compete for 1,300 housing units.

Engineer Says Gaza Port May Soon Be Realized

93AE0101C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 11 Nov pp 1,4

[Article by 'Abd-al-Jabbar 'Adwan]

[Text] London—Palestinian engineer Mahir (Maddukh) (from occupied Gaza) expressed his optimism yesterday that the Israeli occupation authorities soon will approve a project for the construction of a port and an industrial area in Gaza Strip.

In a telephone interview, he said: "The lights we see are very green at this moment, although there are some simple administrative and legal details to overcome." He submitted the project, which he described as "a dream for every Palestinian," three months ago. The reason for the current optimism, as Maddukh says, is that the project is "self-financing and will have the support of local investors, as well as Arab and Palestinians investors and participants abroad. The estimated cost of the project is \$190 million, which is equivalent to half of the cost of any other proposed project. The plan provides for the employment of 22,000 local workers, and the project

will take 26 months to complete from the date of approval and the start of work on it."

In a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Maddukh said the Israeli authorities have been indicating for several months that they support the idea of establishing projects in the occupied territories, particularly in Gaza Strip, in order to employ the local labor force." He said: "Thus the idea of establishing a port and an industrial area came into being. This would ensure continued employment for the local labor force and would revive the area's economy in general. In addition to the project's self-financing, the idea of employing the local labor force was one of the factors that convinced the Israeli authorities to approve the project, which is not linked to the peace process or to its outcome."

But Mahir Maddukh stressed that the port will be a border post and a port of entry belonging to the state, whether for the Palestinian state, eventually, or for the autonomous authority, if agreement is reached on it and if a result is achieved through negotiations on this matter. The project will be built on land at the port, which is like an island in the sea, and will be privately owned.

The exciting thing about the project in general is that it will be established in the sea, which will do away with the need for expensive, privately owned lands or state-owned land, which Israel has seized most of, or lands on which Israel built settlements, particularly on the Strip's coast, in the area extending from Rafah in the south to Dayr al-Balah in the north, approximately half the Gaza Strip's length. Israel has also built settlements on the northern coast near Jabaliya and Bayt Lahya.

Maddukh added that a 500 meter-wide causeway is all the land required to link the island port to the rest of the Strip's roads. The originator of this project said the island will be built of blocks of cement mixed with other, locally available materials (the engineer declined to reveal their nature). He also preferred not to reveal the location of the island.

These blocks will extend from the coast to 1,000 meters into the sea, with a width of 3,000 meters. It will be like an island linked to the land by a 500-meter-wide causeway, so the island will have four sides, in addition to the natural coast that faces it from land. "Thus we will gain 3,000 dunums of land (3 million cubic meters). It will be 7 meters high from the water level. Two wave breakers will be built around the island. The western side will be 26 meters deep, where the port, the mooring docks, and a medium size ship-building yard will be built."

He continued: "The island's eastern side, it will be for private use. The land will be sold for \$150 per square yard, whether it is used for building houses, offices, or tourist facilities. This will contribute to covering the cost of building the island. The industrial area of the island will be sold for viable economic projects owned by individuals, by public holding companies, or by groups.

This will include some 60 projects. Half of these projects have been reviewed so far. There is still a possibility for accepting more new projects that may be proposed by any investor. The investor, of course, chooses any planned project."

Mahir Maddukh said: "There is now a constituent body to oversee the project. This consists of 200 academics, merchants, and business men, of which 140 are from Gaza and the rest from the West Bank. The body is trusted with administering the project. A board of directors, financial and legal committees, and an investment committee to facilitate Arab and Palestinian participation from abroad will be set up. Industrial projects in the area will cost between \$500,000 to \$4 million. Feasibility studies will be sent out to those interested in investment after receiving the Israeli authorities' approval of the project as a whole.

One of the important projects in the industrial area is water-generated electric power. It is a method that would decrease energy consumption in Gaza Strip, which is now served by Israeli companies—something that is undesirable under any form of political or economic independence.

Concluding his statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Mahir Maddukh said building of this island port is totally independent from other proposals, such as the EC building a port or a new port to replace Gaza's small port. The idea of self-reliance in building the port and selling land on the island is a pioneering idea that can depend on the private funds of Palestinians everywhere. The new concept about building the island is that it needs no diving, dumping, or foreign expertise or aid."

Figures on Palestinian Labor in Israel Listed

93AE0101B London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
11 Nov 92

[Text] Dr. Majid Subayh said that lack of legal protection for most of the Palestinians workers in Area 48 [Israel] has made them easy prey for all kinds of fraud and swindling by various parties. These workers are subject to discrimination, inequalities, and the denial of their rights by Israeli employers, employment bureaus, and the Israeli national insurance authority.

Dr. Subayh, director of labor studies in Ramallah in the West Bank, said at a seminar titled *Arab Labor in Area 48: Its Volume, Distribution, and Characteristics* held at the Arab Intellectual Gathering in Jerusalem that the rate of pay for Arab workers is low in comparison with the Israeli workers' wages, in terms of profession and location. The skilled Arab workers' average pay is only 39 percent of the Israeli workers' pay. The ordinary Arab worker's monthly pay is equal to only 33 percent of the Israeli worker.

Dr. Subayh affirmed in his lecture that discrimination against the Arab worker is being carried out with the full knowledge of the Israeli Government and the Israeli labor union, the Histadrut.

He said that for economic reasons the Israeli employers prefer employing Arab workers, particularly casual, unskilled workers because it costs less to hire them than it does to hire Israeli workers. An Israeli employer not only gains an added value by employing the Palestinian worker, he also gains an added value due to wage difference between the Palestinian worker and the Israeli worker, who tend to be part of the Israeli bourgeoisie. In addition, the Israeli employer saves even more by employing Palestinian casual workers. Speaking about the methods of evading the Arab workers' rights, Dr. Subayh said this was due to the weakness of the Arab labor organization working in Area 48.

Dr. Subayh cited two types of social insurance being applied to the Palestinian workers in Area 48, particularly casual workers. One is the Israeli national insurance, and the other is the collective labor contracts between the Histadrut and the Israeli employers. The casual workers do not benefit from any of the two methods.

Dr. Subayh said Israel does not recognize the legality of Arab trade unions as a party authorized to defend the workers' rights before courts. Dr. Subayh wondered about the reason the Histadrut refuses Palestinian workers' membership in it and restricts this privilege only to the inhabitants of Jerusalem. He said the lack of legal protection for most of the Palestinian workers has turned them into an easy prey to all kinds of fraud. Because of this situation, the Arab workers resort to lawyers in order to obtain their rights, and lawyers charge them 10 to 20 percent. One of the tricks being used is to give the Palestinian workers open-ended leave, without notifying them of the date they are due to return to work. Upon the worker's return, he is informed by the Israeli employer that he has overstayed his leave, and, therefore, he is dismissed.

A lecture by Nizam ('Ataya) contained statistics about workers in Area 48, including those from the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. He said 148,964 workers from the West Bank, including Jerusalem, and 40,500 from Gaza were employed in Area 48 in 1992. 'Ataya said 31 percent of the workers are from urban areas and 60.5 percent are from the countryside.

According to Israeli statistics, 8.8 percent of total workers in Area 48 are employed in agriculture in the West Bank, 11.8 percent in Israeli industry, 59 percent in Israeli construction, and 20 percent in other sectors. The grand total is 61,900 workers, according to statistics.

In the Gaza Strip, 16 percent work in agriculture, 9 percent in Israeli industries, 62 percent in construction, and 12 percent in other sectors, out of the total number of workers. According to Israeli statistics, the total number of workers employed in these sectors is 41,800. As for the West Bank, 13,108 workers are employed in

agriculture, 17,577 in industry, 87,888 in construction, and 17,875 in other sectors. In the Gaza Strip, 6,400 work in agriculture, 3,645 in industry, 25,110 in construction, and 4,860 in other sectors.

According to the statistics, the number of Palestinian workers from the West Bank working in Area 48 total 48.2 percent of the actual labor force. In Gaza, the number of workers from the Strip's inhabitants working in area 48 constitute 32.3 percent of the actual labor force.

Editor Sees Confederation as Practical Solution

93AE0101A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 20 Oct 92
p 8

[Commentary by Yasir al-Za'atirah, editor-in-chief of MUSLIM PALESTINE magazine]

[Text] There is no doubt that the currently proposed Palestinian autonomy plan to resolve the Palestinian portion of the Arab-Israeli conflict brings to the fore a number of problems that those concerned with the issue are still trying to conceal from their people for fear of clashing with them, which would mean halting the progress of the settlement plan or going ahead with it blindly.

Some people say the autonomy plan is not clear, and so it is premature to talk about the problems it brings to the fore. But the fact is that the plan's general framework has become clear or, at least, semi-clear, which would enable examining the risks it involves, at least by the select, educated people. But the politicians wish to postpone this kind of "headache" until later.

It must be said right from the start that the general belief is that establishment of a Palestinian state is unlikely, not only because there is a U.S. commitment to this effect, but because all evidence indicates this direction. Also, the Israeli Government is still precluding any plan that may come close to the concept of Palestinian state, and it is supported in this effort by the U.S. Administration. Didn't James Baker tell the Palestinians in his recent tour that legislative elections are rejected because these elections could only be held in a state, and Palestine is not a state?

Therefore, the present arrangements are based on the autonomy formula that is closer to a municipal council, as the British newspaper THE INDEPENDENT characterized it. Discussion, therefore, should proceed from this premise. It is a self-evident fact that the municipal council or the autonomous government will not remain suspended in the air. Eventually it has to be attached to a state because it is not going to develop into a state. We believe there are three options here:

- A Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli confederation.
- A Palestinian-Jordanian confederation.
- A Palestinian-Israeli confederation.

In order to discuss these options first it must be said that the use of the term "confederation" is a kind of an expression of hope, because confederation can only take place between two states. The Palestinian entity is not a state, and when the Palestinians talk about confederation, they want to reassure Israel that they are aware that an independent Palestinian state is out of the question. Therefore, in return for this reassurance, they want the Israelis to accept the use of this term, even if it can be used only when a state is involved.

Faysal al-Husayni's proposal to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli confederation is only intended to lure the Israelis into equating them with the Jordanians. What is tempting about this is that a confederation of this kind will certainly be dominated by the Israelis. Otherwise, where is the balance in the military and economic power between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian entity.

Al-Husayni's proposal is indeed enticing for the Israelis. It would be the beginning of a confederation that they will practically dominate. On the other hand, it will provide them with a solution for a problem that they will face when in the coming stage, that is, the stage that follows the signing of the peace treaties. This question will penetrate the Arab and Islamic reality politically, economically, and socially because the official and popular Arab and Islamic embarrassment will vanish when dealing with such a confederation, which certainly will not be the case in dealing with the State of Israel.

We leave the second option until later, and move on to the third, which is the option some Palestinian voices have begun to promote, although only quietly now. These voices reiterate well-known questions, such as "What has the Arab nation done for us?" And "What have the Arabs offered us? They have killed more from our people than the Israelis did. Is it in our interest to ally ourselves with the Jews?" And so on. Such questions will escalate in the future. There is no doubt that such an option seems suitable for Israel, particularly since it would realize the advantages we have already talked about in the tripartite confederation.

The second option, the Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, is more complex. It seems to be favored by the Israelis, as well as by the Palestinian side and probably by the Jordanian side, without the dangers that might result from it being realized.

Apparently we need to reiterate that in this case, the term "confederation" is wrong. The correct term is "federation." However, we will discuss both possibilities.

If the proposal is federation, then this is exactly the "alternative homeland" that Zionist literature has been talking about because 2.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza will join this federation, which means that the Palestinians will form 75 percent of it. Consequently, any democratic forum will lead to the Palestinians dominating the government and the various state institutions. Is this not the alternative homeland?

Then let us join the optimists and say that the formula will be a confederation. Will this change the situation to a great extent? Let us see.

Obviously the question of the return of refugees will not be realized—something that the peace process now indicates. This means that the refugees will remain in Jordan, whether they are compensated or not. In which case, they will become fully assimilated into Jordan's political life and will have no hope to return. Consequently, their disinclination to enter certain [Jordanian Government] institutions will change. They will demand a better and more active political position. Once again we say that from whatever angle you look at this proposal, you will find that you are face to face with the "alternative homeland." In the earlier discussion, we ignored the current proposals about the refugees in Lebanon and the talk about shipping them to Jordan.

The "alternative homeland" proposal remains uppermost on the Israeli mind. All of their scenarios lead in this direction. People should remember that Israel's plan is to create disarray in the Arab situation and to redraw the map around it, which places this issue at the top of the agenda. The Israeli plan—that of Sharon and others—is to partition the Arab countries on sectarian and ideological bases and to turn Jordan into a home for the Palestinians. It is worth noting in this regard that an Israeli plan was published in (QIVUTIM) magazine on 14 February 1982, a publication of the World Zionist Organization in Jerusalem. The article was titled *Israel's Strategy in the 1980's*.

Part of the aforementioned scenarios has not escaped the Arab officials, and for this reason we see them insisting on the Palestinian refugees' right of return and advocating it in every forum. The establishment of the right of return means redressing the Jordanian-Palestinian balance, preserving Jordan, and aborting the "alternative homeland" plan. But how far can the political efforts succeed in this regard?

Many people doubt that this can succeed, and, therefore, their attitude toward the negotiations appears negative. This includes the Islamists, who are not only afraid of the "alternative homeland" plan, but also of the likelihood of serious developments, such as those that have been prevailing since 1970, that would be harmful to the brothers. The Islamists are almost the only people who have not been touched by the germ of regionalism, and their ranks embrace all peoples, including the minorities.

The subject we discussed in this article aims only at raising the vital issues that must be confronted so that we will not blindly follow the path along which the enemy is trying to drag us. It also aims at reminding people of the need to work in order to thwart the "alternative homeland" plan and be wary of its scenarios because this is the plan that all of the loyal forces reject.

China Donates Hospital, School to Gaza Strip*93AE0119C London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
12 Nov 92 p 1*

[Article: "China Donates Hospital Building and School to Occupied Gaza Strip"]

[Text] Beijing—The Government of the People's Republic of China has donated a hospital building and a junior high school to the occupied Gaza Strip. The donation was announced in a letter that the Palestinian ambassador in Beijing, Dr. Mustafa al-Sifardini, forwarded to the PLO leadership in Tunis.

Palestinian President Yasir 'Arafat thanked the Chinese Government for the generous offer and praised its constant role in supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and at international meetings.

AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI has learned that China asked the PLO leadership to select a site it considered suitable in the occupied territory for building the hospital and the school and that the leadership chose the Gaza Strip, which is now suffering from an Arab and Israeli blockade. The Chinese Government promised to undertake the building of the two projects and to send Chinese engineers and workers to the occupied territory for this purpose. It will also equip the hospital and the school with full medical and instructional equipment. It has earmarked a preliminary sum of \$1 million as a first phase. A reliable Palestinian source has told AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI that China has also donated food and canned goods to alleviate the suffering of the people of the occupied territory, especially those in the camps of the Gaza Strip.

Refugees in Lebanon Reject Naturalization*93AE0119D London AL-QUDS AL-'ARABI in Arabic
10 Nov 92 p 5*

[Article by Amin Bisharat: "Palestinians in Lebanon Prefer Emigration to Naturalization"]

[Text] Beirut—Cries of joy rose in al-Miyah wa Miyah Camp when its residents, Palestinian refugees, heard the news that Jewish settlements in the north of occupied Palestine had been shelled with Katyusha rockets. Joy came into the faces of aged men as they gathered in circles praising the operation, as they do whenever one occurs.

'Umar Salim (age 30), who works in health payments, said, "This is what they do whenever a rocket falls on Qiryat Shemona or Nahariya in North Palestine." 'Umar did not know the reason for it, but he said, "I think these operations are reviving the spark of hope in their hearts."

Despite widespread rejection among Palestinians living a life of misery in the camps of the south and other Lebanese camps, Lebanese officials are expressing anxiety about implementing this project. A source in the Lebanese government said, "We reject naturalization, and the Palestinians do also, but Israel and America

want it to happen, and I think the current balance of power allows them to implement their projects on the ground without need for our agreement." However, as long as this is the case, the Lebanese are insisting on reducing their number. Official circles now estimate it at about 302,000 persons, while PLO sources put it at a half million. To achieve this goal, the Lebanese Interior Ministry has begun implementing "polite transfer" (the expression used by the magazine FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH, which reflects the view of the PLO). This plan boils down to deleting the names of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon from the registers on the pretext that they hold other citizenships. The Lebanese Directorate of Public Security, which is under the Interior Ministry, has been able to delete the names of 16,000 Palestinian refugees and has withdrawn their Lebanese travel documents and the identification cards it issued to them during their presence in Lebanon.

Many Lebanese officials support the view of one official, the minister 'Abdallah al-Amin, known for his closeness to the Syrian leadership. He has declared openly, "The condition of the Palestinians ought not to improve. If they feel comfortable, they will not think about returning to their country." Ibrahim al-'Abd (age 60) said that the Palestinians were experiencing difficult conditions here, but that these conditions were not enough to make them resolve to return and liberate [their country]. He added, "I do not accept naturalization and will not give up my Palestinian nationality, even if they give me all the money in the world." He went on to say, "We feel that we are lost. It is not a question of an identity card I carry or a passport given to me."

Al-Najjab Posits Turning to UN If Talks Fail*93AE0119B Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 11 Nov 92 p 7*

[Interview with PLO Executive Committee member Sulayman al-Najjab by Muhammad Bin-'Ammar in Tunis; date not given: "America's Interests Will Push Peace Process Forward; Saudi Arabia's Position Will Contribute to Success of Negotiations"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted]

Impasse

[Bin-'Ammar] How do you envision the coming phase if the current negotiations end in an impasse?

[Al-Najjab] For our part, we will make every possible effort so that the negotiations yield their desired results. However, if the Israeli position remains as it is today, our only option will be to go back to the Security Council and ask it to look for another suitable and effective framework for implementing its resolutions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and conditions in the Middle East. [passage omitted]

Not True

[Bin-'Ammar] What is the truth about a difference in positions between Syria and the PLO concerning the course of the negotiating process?

[Al-Najjab] We must be very alert to the Israeli game of trying to sow the seeds of doubt among the Arab parties. When Rabin assumed the post of prime minister of Israel, he expressed his optimism about achieving progress on the Palestinian front first. Then he came back and spoke about progress on the Syrian front.

We know the difference between the situation on the Palestinian track, which is still discussing a transition period, and the situation on the Syrian track, which is discussing the implementation of Resolution 242.

We welcome any progress on the Syrian track on the basis of implementing Resolution 242 and a commitment to a comprehensive settlement. We do not discount the emergence of differences in the course of the negotiations, but these differences must be resolved on the basis of the position of the Arab consensus, so as to serve the interests of all the Arab parties. We firmly believe that Israel's isolating any Arab party will not be to the interest of that party or to the interest of the other Arab parties. [passage omitted]

We Respect the Opposition

[Bin-'Ammar] Don't you think the position of the Palestinian opposition seemed to be collapsing?

[Al-Najjab] We respect the positions of the patriotic opposition. What is new are the charges the opposition has leveled at the Palestinian leadership and its delegation to the negotiations—false charges that were refuted in full in the [Central] Council. Also new was the undiplomatic language the opposition used in dealing with our disagreements and the opposition's attempts to create alignments with parties outside the PLO or that have split from it. The great majority of these parties have no influence worth mentioning on the Palestinian people.

During the meetings, these parties affirmed their commitment to the unity and defense of the PLO. We hope these parties will continue this course of theirs outside the council. We respect their right to act, as long as they use democratic methods, avoid heaping charges or using language unsuitable to political activity, and respect the decision of the majority. [passage omitted]

Al-Husayni Discounts Clinton's Campaign Quotes 93AE0119A Jeddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 8 Nov 92 p 7

[Interview with Faysal al-Husayni, head of advisory committee to Palestinian negotiating delegation, by Muhammad Bin-'Ammar in Tunis; date not given: "Seventh Round Resumes in Atmosphere of Transition"]

[Text] [Bin-'Ammar] How do you assess what was achieved during the first part of the seventh negotiating round?

[Al-Husayni] The outstanding achievement during the first part of the seventh round of bilateral negotiations was that for the first time the process of unofficial negotiations or talks between the Palestinian and Israeli delegations took off. We hope by this process to examine and explore the possibilities and limits of Israeli movement, because the Israelis to date have not taken a single tangible step in the direct official negotiations.

Progress in Multilateral Negotiations

[Bin-'Ammar] This being the case with regard to the bilateral negotiations, what about the multilateral negotiations?

[Al-Husayni] At the level of the multilateral negotiations we have seen a very important development: full Palestinian participation—that is to say, from inside the occupied territories and from outside—in these negotiations. Thus we have come to be at the center and in the heart of the negotiations practically and openly.

Officially, there is now a representative of the Palestinian people, inasmuch as representation no longer is limited to the Palestinians of the occupied territory.

Shamir's Departure

[AL-Husayni] The other aspect in which we have achieved some progress in regard to principle is that we are no longer negotiating with Yitzhaq Shamir, who was propounding extremist historical and ideological theses. Now we are talking with Yitzhaq Rabin, who propounds security-related theses. At least these are discussable, although the goals of Shamir and Rabin are the same: namely, to control land. However, we ought to consider Rabin's theses and debate them in the assurance that we can refute them and thus deal better with the peace process.

American Role Vital

[Bin-'Ammar] The obstacles to the progress of the negotiations are still many. How can these obstacles be overcome in the negotiations that resume tomorrow?

[Al-Husayni] The process demands growth and increase in the active role of the two sponsors of the peace conference, especially the role of the United States. It also demands more European intervention and pressure. More than anything else, the question remains dependent on the Palestinian position—a position that insists on progress and on reaching the achievement of its goals not merely by sitting around the negotiating table, but also by work in the field.

Clinton's Aides

[Bin-'Ammar] How do you see the coming negotiations in light of president-elect Bill Clinton's victory in the American elections?

[Al-Husayni] The next phase will indeed take place under the new administration of President-elect Bill Clinton of the United States. It will demand that the American administration be fully acquainted with and informed about all sides of the subject and that its position toward the peace process be sound as regards the Palestinian issue and the Middle East as a whole.

This may take some time waiting for the new president to take up his duties and form his administration. Things will depend on the team that the president-elect chooses and who he assigns to the task of overseeing and following up the negotiations. That is to say, will the person be an expert in Middle Eastern affairs, or will the president entrust matters to new management that have to become acquainted with the record?

In any case, we think that the coming phase will be a transitional phase that ought to be short, to facilitate pushing the peace process forward or looking for another way out.

We Do Not Worry About Candidates' Statements

[Bin-'Ammar] After Mr. Clinton's statements, do you expect the active role of the United States in the peace process to continue?

[Al-Husayni] We really do not attach much importance to what was said before and during the election campaign, because we are dealing with the president-elect, not with the presidential candidate. We hope the new American administration will be more positive than its predecessor in dealing with our cause and with the problems of the Middle East in general.

[Bin-'Ammar] Do you expect a growing American role in the region?

[Al-Husayni] We want the United States to have an increasing role and greater pressure on the Israeli negotiators in the direction of pushing the peace process forward, because we see that the Israeli side is holding up many issues, thus obstructing the achievement of any progress in the peace process.

The Israelis are trying to surround the peace process with a thick fog, especially Resolution 242, the resolution on withdrawal and the resolution on the nature of the territory—that it is considered occupied. At a certain point, all of these subjects need direct intervention by the United States to bring Israel to a positive position that will enable progress in the negotiations.

Growing Arab Coordination

[Bin-'Ammar] What is your assessment of Arab coordination in these negotiations?

[Al-Husayni] Regrettably, when we entered the negotiations at the Madrid conference, there was no Arab-Arab coordination. Now, however, there is coordination that grows every day. He hope some day to reach the stage at which we can say that this coordination is up to the level of the responsibility.

Report Reviews Economic Group Working Paper

93AE0141A Nicosia FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH
in Arabic 15 Nov 92 pp 10-12

[Article: "Until Palestine Joins the World Bank and the IMF, 'Welcome to the Qalandiyah Airport'"]

[Text] While Israel advocates an international plan to develop the Middle East, France prefers a regional fund for development. The Palestinians, however, notice an abundance of development funds—the Arab Development Fund, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank, not to mention five regional development funds. They would opt, therefore, for a Palestinian development fund to enhance the contributions of Palestine as an effective partner of regional cooperation.

The development committee is perhaps the most important of the five committees of settlement discussions. The relationship between bilateral and multilateral talks was perhaps best expressed by Britain's David (Goth) who chaired the development committee's second meeting in Paris last 29-30 October. He said that there were "positive developments in the bilateral talks on Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and in the multilateral peace discussions."

The development committee has no parallel in importance except for the committee on refugees. While the international parties attach more importance to the former, the Arabs, and especially the Palestinians, give priority to the latter.

In any case, the Palestinian delegation to the development committee's Paris meeting, attended by 40 world countries and 13 Arab countries, articulated in its working paper a link between the progress in bilateral discussions and the progress of multilateral talks. It even demanded in the first point of its assessment of the "political climate" that the "Palestinian Liberation Organization, in its capacity as the sole and legitimate leader and representative of the Palestinian people, should be allowed to participate fully and directly in all phases of the peace process."

It demanded in the second point that Palestinian representation be rectified with the participation of Palestinians from Eastern Jerusalem in the bilateral talks as well as in all bilateral action groups. All of the other four points carried the same message.

The Palestinian working paper linked Palestinian economic development to regional cooperation but warned that the strong "appeal" of regional cooperation and of prosperity as a reward for peace should not mask the

Palestinian people's major stumbling block, which obstructs it from participating in regional cooperation and from benefiting from it. To wit, Israeli occupation.

The Palestinian working paper, read by expert Zayn (Mayaci), advanced four economic demands that must be met:

- Israeli recognition of the Palestinian people's right to possess and exercise economic decision-making authority.
- Allowing the Palestinian economy enough time to recover from martial directives and other mandatory controls imposed upon it by the occupation authority.
- Ample international aid. Here the paper applauded the European aid "given to us directly" and likewise thanked EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries that have also begun to extend aid to occupied Palestinian territories.
- Structural reforms and the liberalization of existing economics are essential for economic development and regional cooperation. The paper said: "We must launch an ambitious development effort before we, as Palestinians, can be in a position to sit down as [full] partners and discuss regional cooperation. Otherwise, we will continue as mere beneficiaries of that cooperation, taking without giving, as a poor relation of the countries of the region."

The Palestinian working paper then went into its field of specialization, pointing out that Palestine has the technical ability to draw a plan for national economic development. In view of its importance, we have published it below.

"Third: Designating Development Priorities

"As long as occupation remains, there will probably be more pressing development projects and plans than the occupation will allow. Furthermore, local savings and foreign financial aid, even if combined, probably will not be adequate to finance but a very limited number of projects. Sound planning, whether partially by businessmen or by local or central governments or both, requires setting priorities on the basis of carefully determined standards. But occupation conditions render planning and prioritizing a luxury to which the Palestinian economy and Palestinian society can not aspire prior to self-rule because the final decision will be out of Palestinians hands as long as occupation continues.

"But despite this constant barrier of occupation, we can still select a number of urgent projects and plans. Knowing which will be allowed by the occupying authority, however, is a question that can be answered only after scrutiny and examination. This may be ascertained by the parties concerned, be they individuals, firms, or institutions; by local or municipal governments; or by specialized councils (in the sectors of health, education, and training, for example).

"But examination and scrutiny may also be undertaken by OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and

Development] members. Such action on their part would be of great help to the Palestinian people and would give more weight to similar efforts within occupied Palestinian territories.

"In addition to such scrutiny, which most probably will not result in an integrated and cohesive list of programs and projects, it is our position that the priorities must target, to the extent possible, bolstering and supporting the economy to make it better able to perform in a way that helps meet both basic needs and export requirements.

"It seems to us that the following are the fields, i.e. the sectors, programs, and activities whose development would drive the economy and bolster it.

"1. Manpower Training as a Major Element of Development.

"The training we need has to cover a wide range of technical, administrative, consulting, valuation, and other skills. It should, as a practical matter, involve all components of the government, business, and cooperative sectors as well as all of the economic and social sectors. The Palestinians, as they begin to prepare for assuming self-government and for building their state, will have limited resources as they start to manage their own projects, their central and local governments, and their social and educational services and other economic sectors.

"2. Investment in a Variety of Industries With Emphasis on Those That Support Housing Programs.

"Housing programs constitute a massive, critical, and pressing need in view of the fact that between 180,000 and 200,000 residential units, each accommodating six persons on average, will be needed between now and the end of the transitional period of self-rule. The housing and construction sector nurtures a number of support industries that are vertically integrated with it (such as construction materials, the pipe industry, electrical equipment, woodworking, tiles, bathroom fixtures, etc.) in addition to the social and material infrastructures of various sectors that are implied by this integration. Infrastructure requirements would include drains and sewers, playgrounds, schools, commercial zones, local streets, clinics, etc. Massive need, which in truth can not be met before a number of years have passed, and the restoration of housing units that have severely deteriorated, will combine to create continuing demand for building and construction, in return rendering that sector capable of employing more of the work force and will ensure continued demand for its services for a long time to come.

"Other sectors that experience domestic demand for certain components include agriculture, where fodder for export will require materials and equipment for packaging and shipping.

"But investment in transition industries goes a lot farther than providing the component needs of building and housing. It involves the ability to introduce new technology-intensive industries side by side with "traditional" industries. The cement industry, which we envision establishing in al-Khalil, commands a high priority in that respect.

"3. Expanding and Developing Social and Physical Infrastructures

"The deterioration of infrastructure in both urban and rural communities, and the absence of certain basic components of that infrastructure, make it urgently necessary to put treatment and correction at the head of the priorities list because infrastructure is a basic component of satisfactory economic performance that would render both the economy and society capable of meeting the needs of citizens. The social infrastructure is likewise worn-out and has suffered similar deterioration. Examples are educational institutions at all three levels, training centers and facilities, and health facilities such as clinics, hospitals, and laboratories. All of those institutions have a pressing need for modern equipment, specialized personnel, and appropriate buildings. They are also unable to meet needs such as the training of doctors, midwives, and other specialized nurses and meeting patient demand for hospital beds. In both cases, i.e., in health and in education, the deterioration and lack of services are even more painfully apparent in rural than in urban areas.

"So far, we have focused on infrastructure in general. The time has come to advance specific infrastructure proposals needed by the economy as tools to serve development objectives. These include:

"A. Constructing a commercial deep-water port in Gaza. If this were accompanied by oil and gas pipelines and a refinery to meet the demand of Palestinians for petroleum products (including petrochemicals), the Gaza strip would then enjoy an important industrial infrastructural complex. Building and operating such a complex would serve the economy as a whole and its various sectors such as communications (exports and imports), energy, construction, agriculture, and transition industries. Furthermore, a marine port would serve the objectives of regional cooperation by promoting eastbound transit trade to Jordan and beyond to countries of the Arab peninsula. It would also promote the westbound transit of exports from Jordan and others to the Arab countries of North Africa, and maybe even to countries of southern Europe.

"B. Expand and modernize Qalandiyah airport to serve and facilitate air travel between Palestine and Arab and Islamic countries and also between Palestine and countries outside the Arab region. This project coexists with the need to integrate Arab airline services in order to coordinate their operations and reduce operating and administrative costs. Indeed, such a project has been thoroughly studied but a decision on it is yet to be made.

"C. The feed systems of Palestinian electric companies in the occupied territories are not components of a unified network. A single national network must be established in order to reduce vertical and administrative expense and to create the supply-demand balance that is missing at this time. Moreover, the current generated by the proposed network should be expanded to meet present as well as future demand. Such expansion must take into consideration the expected rise in demand by industry, agriculture, and tourism as well as for related services, street lighting, and escalating household consumption.

"D. It is necessary to greatly expand sewer networks, especially in rural areas, which, in the absence of funding, lack appropriate sewers and, in most cases, employ open ducts. Such conditions are not only a threat to general health but also, as an indicator of low quality of life, undermine societal dignity and detract from the beauty of the surroundings, as well.

"Finally, water conditions in the Gaza Strip are at the point of grave danger because of excessive salinity, nitrogen content, and pollution, which are all the result of the Jewish settlements' exploitation of subterranean water resources in the strip, forcing the natives of Gaza to use wells contaminated with seawater, which carries chemicals harmful both to agriculture and to human life. Furthermore, there are vast areas in the Gaza Strip that are covered with sewage or piles of garbage, despite their proximity to residential areas. This manifestation of deteriorating infrastructure has attracted local and world attention, but necessary corrective steps have yet to be taken.

"The previous discussion of the infrastructure indicates that many of the aforementioned factors, if corrected or developed, would be beneficial to national development and to regional cooperation, as well.

"4. Institutional Fulfillment

"Advancing Palestinian economic institutions and raising their efficiency will continue to be a major requirement for development. Institutional paralysis under the occupation and obstacles to creating and activating new institutions are responsible to a large degree for the current severe shortages. This holds true, as well, of development credit banks, commercial banks, sectoral organizations, expert and consulting engineering and economic research firms, municipal structures, farm field services, packaging and marketing organizations, and large contractor companies.

"It goes without saying that correcting basic structural shortages cannot be accomplished as fast as active development plans would require. Treating this condition can commence only if Israel changes its obstructive policies and delaying tactics in this regard. It is therefore mandatory to create Palestinian institutions and provide them with equipment and qualified technicians and with the necessary funds to energize them, if they already exist. The reason for the urgency is that international

agencies and institutions in the country—donors of financial, technical, training, and consulting aid—rightfully believe that their counterparts among Palestinian national institutions should be the conduit through which aid to Palestine must be channeled. We will proceed to highlight three institutions that are vitally important for modernizing and developing the Palestinian economy.

"A. The Palestine Development Fund is of great importance in supplying venture capital for the sectors of transition industries, agriculture, and housing. This fund could be in the form of a single institution with various departments each specializing in one of the aforementioned sectors. On the theory that each of the various sectors would have its own specific circumstances and policies on financing, corrective procedures, and various operational concepts, the fund could alternatively be a composite of separate funding units each involved with one of the sectors. A composite such as that, if it came to be, would require oversight by some commission or authority whose members are preferably drawn from each of the public, private, and cooperative sectors. Such a body would devise a strategy for the allocation of resources to the various sectors, each on the basis of its requirements and of its contribution to the economy as a whole.

"We hope, and expect, that wealthy Palestinians, Arab and Islamic nations, the European Community, EFTA nations, Japan, the United States, and Canada—as major prospective sources—would help capitalize the proposed Palestine Development Fund.

"Palestine, once it becomes a member of the World Bank and of the IMF, would be entitled to receive loans from those two international agencies to finance development projects and cover certain balance of payments needs. (Palestine is presently a member of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, and the Islamic Development Bank. It receives aid from the Arab Development Fund and the Islamic Development Bank).

"It would be natural for the proposed Palestine Development Fund to have headquarters in Jerusalem. Its capital must be adequately large to enable it to give development a strong push. The fund, by propelling national development, will be able at the appropriate time to provide the Palestinian economy with the infrastructural and production facilities that could bolster the contributions of Palestine as an effective partner of regional cooperation.

"We feel that there is more current need for a Palestinian development fund than for a regional development fund because the Arab region already boasts the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, and five other Arab regional funds—all of which provide Arab countries with loans and grants. (Two of the latter five funds extend aid even to needy non-Arab Third World countries). These funds had aggregate combined capitals

and reserves of \$38.7 billion in 1990 and it would be reasonable to expect that those capitals will expand as the volumes of operations warrant.

"B. A center for the dissemination of technology would be a major component in the network of Palestinian institutions. There is no need here to underline the importance of appropriate technology to various aspects of economic activity. Attention to affairs of technology must be ingrained in the minds of all those involved with economic activity who should bear in mind that their operations require them to select the appropriate technology, be it simple or complex, and must therefore proceed to employ the technology that is appropriate for their type of production.

"But effectively raising awareness of technology would require more than the creation of a relevant authority or authorities. Cognizance of the role of technology and its function should become an integral part of the educational process. In all cases, awareness of technology's central role in development should not be spread with speeches and slogans, but with visual and tactile aids—i.e., by driving the point home visually and with the aid of actual applications in agriculture, industry, and medical services, for example.

"C. A national accounting or auditing bureau that would exercise ultimate oversight over and regulation of the public sector. Such a bureau would ensure compliance by all public entities with the standards, tenets, and correct procedures related to public expenditure. An advantage of the bureau would be to enable the people to take government agencies to account, thereby endowing government with fiscal validity that it would not otherwise have. Needless to say, the bureau's staff should enjoy impeccable reputations of honesty, courage, and incorruptibility."

The above study highlights areas that would help the economy propel development. Those areas are intertwined and closely and directly interactive. There is no need to remind people that as long as Israeli occupation remains, work can proceed only in a few of those areas, and the resulting development will necessarily be fragmented and incomplete. But this by no means renders the whole operation moot. It is obvious that even if the various projects were not closely related and integrated, each could still make some contribution to the strategy of full and comprehensive Palestinian economic development until such a time as a Palestinian transitional self-government is established and the various projects can be linked together to launch comprehensive and integrated development.

Hamas' Nazzal Denies Draft Agreement With Iran

93AE0134B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Nov 92 p 3

[Article: "Hamas Representative in Jordan Denies Existence of Draft Agreement With Iran"]

[Text] Amman—Muhammad Nazzal, the representative of the Hamas movement in Jordan, has denied the existence of a draft document of agreement between his movement and Tehran. He said that the draft was alleged and without basis.

The draft, which was distributed in the Jordanian capital, says that the Hamas delegation that visited Iran was headed by Ibrahim Ghawshah. It calls for Hamas to be considered the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It considers the PLO and its leadership the antithesis of Hamas. It condemns what it terms acts of murder that the PLO leadership has committed against Hamas supporters in the Gaza Strip and other occupied territories.

The draft, said to have been signed at the Salahabad camp in the Iranian city of Qom, rejects the self-rule negotiations and any results emerging from them. It calls for determining and distinguishing friendly allied forces on the basis of fighting the Jews and calls for classifying neutral forces as hostile because, as it says, there is no neutrality in fighting the Zionist Jews.

Nazzal said in a statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that the front behind the draft document aims at raising doubts about Hamas and its moves on the Arab and Islamic scene. He indicated that Hamas moves openly; it has nothing to hide and nothing that it is afraid to reveal.

Nazzal categorically denied that his movement employs the method of declaring others to be traitors or infidels. He denied that it is trying to monopolize the field of jihad or trying to become the alternative to anyone. He stated that the Palestinian cause needs all forces, whether they be Palestinian, Arab, or Islamic.

He added: "What proves the falsehood of the alleged document are the distortions and errors in information that it contains." He explained that the meetings between the Iranians and Hamas took place in Tehran, not at the Salahabad camp, and that his movement's delegation had been headed by Musa Abu-Marzuq, not Ghawshah.

Hamas Leader Sees Jihad as Alternative to Talks

93AE0134A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
20 Nov 92 p 6

[Article: "Ghawshah: 'We Went to Madrid Under Demeaning Conditions; We Trust the Palestinian People, Will Accept Results of Honest Referendum']

[Text] Amman—In the view of Ibrahim Ghawshah, official spokesman for the Hamas movement, participating in the negotiations, even from an intent to save what can be saved of the lands occupied in 1967, was a mistake that has brought Palestinians into a state of frustration.

Ibrahim Ghawshah said:

"The slogan, 'Let us participate to save what can be saved,' or 'Let us save what remains of the lands occupied in 1967, before the bulldozers of the settlements eat

it up,' were perhaps the most important slogans that misled Palestinian and Arab public opinion. It was under their cover that participation in the Madrid conference took place. Now, a full year after the Madrid conference, we should ask ourselves whether any occupied Palestinian land has been saved and whether the settlement bulldozers have been stopped.

"Without doubt, the phrases 'vacillating in place' and 'impasse' have been the most prominent replies of officials and members of the joint Arab delegations throughout the past rounds. At the same time, these phrases convey the mistake and foolishness of the decision to participate in the Madrid conference, either on the basis of the strategic constants of the Palestinian people or on the basis of the specialized technical political test of going to Madrid under demeaning conditions in accordance with the invitation of the conference sponsor. Going there has brought the Palestinian negotiating delegation (and to some extent the other Arab delegations) into their present state of crisis and has caused rising frustration among the Palestinian and Arab people faced with a big zero for achievements from the negotiations.

"A quick glance at a year's gains and losses shows us that the Zionist enemy has been the big winner in achieving a number of penetrations of the Palestinian and Arab wall. One of the most important of these penetrations was the major breach of recognizing the Zionist enemy practically by the mere sitting of Arab delegations at the negotiating table with an enemy who has been usurping land for 43 years. Another breach was in the area of normalization, which has begun to spread gradually like a disease in the body. Add to this the fall of the blanket ban on recognizing the Zionist enemy as a result of the practical recognition of the Zionist enemy. This has thrown wide open the way to half the inhabitants of the globe (China, India, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and the African countries, with Nigeria foremost among them). Thus, all the political, diplomatic, and human gains that Arab political action, including of course Palestinian political action, had accumulated in terms of encircling and isolating the Zionist entity by exposing its racist, Nazi, expansionist, and inhuman nature—gains achieved in the course of four decades—unfortunately have collapsed suddenly in one year since Madrid.

"Our forecast for the course of the negotiations in the coming phase is more Arab and Palestinian concessions and more Jewish tenacity. The wheel of negotiations will move very slowly, especially after the victory of the Democratic candidate Clinton. There will be more gains for the Zionist enemy in the areas of immigration, settlement, and American arms and support.

"Why do we oppose the negotiations, and what alternative do we have? In addition to the dangers I have

mentioned of the negotiations, the Islamic movement in general, and Hamas in particular, rejects negotiations for reasons of legitimate principle and for political and patriotic reasons. Given the terms of the negotiations, they will not lead to sovereignty, authority, self-determination, or return for the Palestinian people. They threaten penetration of the Arab and Islamic world as a civilization, in addition to economic, cultural, and political penetration. The alternative we propose is what any nation targeted with occupation and colonization would propose: the alternative of jihad, struggle, reliance on one's own available forces (Arab and Islamic)—reliance on the time factor and passing the heavy Zionist attack on to successive generations, thereby reducing its concentration and facilitating dealing with it by continued available modest popular means that gradually will exhaust the Zionist invasion. The intifadah is such a means. It must be deepened and expanded and turned into a jihad operation in which Arab and Muslim youths participate. We must use the weapon of unity and solidarity and the various available natural, demographic, and strategic resources. Hamas, along with the other groups, is actively opposing the settlement proposals, including self-rule. We reject being described as a minority of the Palestinian people. We, along with the Palestinian organizations and groups that oppose the settlement, do not form a minority of the people inside and outside the country. Many events have proved that the opponents of the Madrid-Washington negotiations are the majority. For example, there were the successful strikes of 23 September and 30 October 1992. Palestinian opposition to the negotiations is growing step by step, gradually. It is growing in the country and outside, as we see in the growth of the opposition movement among Palestinians of the diaspora. There are many reasons for this, foremost among them the failure of the negotiating team to produce tangible results that satisfy the Palestinian public. Furthermore, the Palestinian opposition represents the most important Islamic, nationalistic, and leftist currents and active forces in the Palestinian people, as against a minority that monopolizes Palestinian decision-making and official Palestinian institutions such as the National Council, the Central Council, and Palestinian embassies throughout the world. Regretfully, this minority spends the funds of the Palestinian people not on supporting the intifadah, but on media and proteges, so as to control Palestinian opinion through money and the influence of the media.

"As against 10 groups that reject the settlement process, there are three groups, some of them disunited in position, others with limited effectiveness, influence, and strength. This leadership is trying to use the academic elite to justify its policies. It spends lavishly on this elite to compensate for its lack of popular depth and mass appeal.

"The groups opposed to the Madrid project work along two lines. The first is to provide popular political opposition inside and outside the country to overturn the self-rule project, stop the negotiations, withdraw the

Palestinian negotiators, and go back to the Palestinian people to determine their position and decision. We are doing all this by normal means, far from the use of violence, out of our concern for national unity. We engage in political activity by means of communiques, exhibits, forums, strikes, marches, and other means of political action. Our second line of action is confrontation through jihad and intifadah by raising the level of effectiveness of the intifadah and by engaging in specific military operations of jihad. The months of September and October of this year recorded tangible success on both lines. The enemy acknowledged this even before friends did so. This outstanding performance influenced Palestinian public opinion. It also influenced the PLO leadership, which is trying to break the unity of the opposition groups by the varied means that its previous experience and great financial and media resources place at its disposal. The PLO leadership scored some points in its favor at the recent Central Council, but these were soon undercut in the Palestinian street—especially because of the dubious credibility of representation in the Central Council and in the remaining Palestinian institutions, which are subject to one-man decisions both in makeup and selection and by pressures and special directives. The opposition position has also had pan-Arab influence. Arab movements opposed to the settlement have been monitored on the Jordanian, as well as on the Syrian, Lebanese, and Sudanese scenes. Within the Zionist entity, the successes of the opposition forces have inflamed the passions of this entity. Some Zionist forces have demanded a halt to the negotiations and have raised a major question about the extent to which the negotiating team can control internal Palestinian affairs either at this stage or in the coming stage.

"Throughout the negotiations we have observed how American performance has come as a disappointment to the hopes of the Palestinian political cabal that runs the negotiations. This performance has leaned toward the Israeli position, particularly in releasing \$10 billion in loan guarantees, refusing to halt settlement, and refusing to implement Security Council Resolution 242 in the transition period or otherwise. Hamas was one of the first Palestinian groups to call for (and still calls for) a return to the option of democratic consultation, either by electing the members of the Palestinian National Council and other Palestinian institutions or by consulting the Palestinian people inside and outside the country so that they can express their opinion clearly and decisively on the settlement proposals that have been raised, including self-rule, now, and not at the end of the process. The Palestinian leadership is trying to vault over the current crisis. It will be responsible for it before God and history if it does not take the initiative to confront the crisis of dissension in the Palestinian street, if it does not study the possible reasons for this dissension, and if it does not remedy it as soon as possible. It must do these things before we slide into an all-out conflict between Palestinians, one that (God forbid) turns this crisis into another Somali crisis.

"We trust the Palestinian people in religion, patriotism, and consciousness. We will accept an immediate referendum and the honest results of the ballot box."

EGYPT

Air Force Lieutenant General Interviewed

93AF0152A Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
30 Oct 92 pp 36-37, 70

[Interview with Air Force Lieutenant General Ahmad Nasr, commander of the Egyptian Air Force, by Hamdi Lutfi; place and date not given: "Egyptian Air Force Completes Its 60th Year"]

[Excerpts] Next Monday, 2 November 1992, our Egyptian Air Force completes its 60th year. Lieutenant General Ahmad Nasr, the commanding officer of the Egyptian Air Force, spoke to AL-MUSAWWAR about this occasion.

He explained how our Air Force deals with "the difficult balance" between the state's fulfilling the requirements of military expenditure for national security and defense of the nation and, at the same time, providing financial resources for economic growth projects. He also explained several considerations that influence the daily performance of Egyptian Air Force personnel.

Lt. Gen. (Pilot) Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman Nasr is 58 years old and has 36 years military service. He has been commander of the Egyptian Air Force since April 1990. I began my interview by asking him:

[Lutfi] Did you see service in the 1956 tripartite attack against Egypt?

[Nasr] Yes. After I graduated from the Egyptian Air Academy in February 1956, I flew the English [Viper] aircraft and, later, a Russian MiG-15 for nine months. Then, I fought in the 1956 War in a MiG-17. Later, I flew a MiG-19 and a MiG-21 in the October 1973 War, as well as the Sukhoi-7. In the mid-1970's, I flew an American Phantom fighter.

[Lutfi] I would like to ask two questions. The first is about the Egyptian Air Force having new batches of American and French aircraft. One journalist said that Egypt is correcting the Arab-Israeli balance of power, which has been affected by the growth of the Israeli Air Force, as well as the departure of the Iraqi Air Force from the Arab scene, following its huge losses in the war to liberate Kuwait, preceded by the Iran-Iraq War. How do you view the correction of this balance in your military thinking?

[Nasr] Among our basic tasks is to bring the Air Force up to the level of deterrent ability. It has the most modern fighter aircraft, or rather, the most modern aircraft to carry out the Egyptian Armed Forces' combat tasks, such as the American F-16C, the French Mirage 2000, and the early warning Hawkeye aircraft. There is no final stage

for our efforts in keeping pace with armament development in the advanced world. We will never hesitate to look for whatever is new, in order to assert—in a practical way—the Egyptian Air Force's position as an effective power in the Arab region and to maintain the military balance by acquiring elements of superiority. It is a serious race, the details and secrets of which cannot be dealt with publicly.

Modernizing aircraft with radar-guided missiles, instead of the traditional heat-seeking missiles, is receiving considerable development in building new generations of future aircraft. They represent the Egyptian Air Force's most advanced weapons. Thanks to God, Egypt has valuable manpower. It has advanced, practical programs in the Egyptian Air Academy for pilots and navigators. The Air Force's factories are now augmented by circuitry, computer, and electronics factories. Before the pilot graduates, he gets approximately 200 hours training on those central sciences, including the latest programs to qualify him—scientifically, physically, and intellectually—to fly the most modern "year 2000" aircraft at the highest combat levels. Muscle and nerve coordination, and efficiency, ultimately develop the "eagles of tomorrow" in quality and quantity.

Aircraft technical maintenance systems are among the most important and serious accomplishments for pilots of the modern age. Maintenance no longer has the traditional limited meaning, but rather, it is the basis of an exacting process that relies on computers, especially in dealing with spare parts, most of which we now manufacture in Egypt. The tasks of equipping the different kinds of aircraft—nearly 50 types—require very advanced workshops, apart from the missile workshops. They are involved in maintaining the means of communications in aircraft, and the navigation and target-sighting gear, laser-guided bombs and missiles, as well as drone aircraft equipped with the most modern sensors and cameras, capable of covering all our surrounding geographic fronts and depths. [passage omitted]

Certainly, variable-purpose artificial satellites represent the most important element of this system, since they give an immediate, continual picture of the situation. However, they will not cancel out the role of the traditional reconnaissance aircraft, or the role of pilotless aircraft or early warning aircraft. All of these aircraft represent multiple means for the integrated data base.

From my viewpoint as a pilot, I see the importance of the Arab nations' attempt to have artificial satellites, as one step toward our self-reliance. [passage omitted]

With regard to the Egyptian Air Force, the Gulf war was not the first indication of the importance of electronic warfare. For some time, we have been working in various ways to acquire electronic warfare capability through exercises abroad, local manufacture, and Egyptian development, working to keep pace with the rapid world development of this equipment. In the first stage of our interest, we worked to lessen dependence—as much as

possible—on the major powers, in the event we were forced into unilateral military action, in defense of our national security.

Air-to-air refueling of fighters and bombers is very important. It has greatly increased the distances that aircraft can cover in their tasks and, consequently, has contributed to bolstering our Air Force's ability to participate in defending the security of friendly Arab nations, because this defends—at the same time—the security of the Egyptian nation. Certainly, I have stressed that air transport and methods of air supply were effectively and rapidly used during the first stages of the Kuwaiti occupation crisis, despite the huge costs involved. [passage omitted]

Military Expenditure and the Egyptian Economy

[Lutfi] What about the joint exercises with Arab and friendly nations? Have they stopped now?

[Nasr] No, they are going according to schedule and according to previous agreements, in order to attain practical answers to exacting military questions, posed by the circumstances of each country. The answers are being searched for in these joint exercises or maneuvers.

[Lutfi] Permit me to ask a delicate question about Egypt's economy and the reforms through which it is going, the rise in prices, pressures on governmental spending, the obligations and sacrifices needed to confront a crisis or sudden disaster, like the 12 October 1992 earthquake, and the efforts made, personally, by President Mubarak to overcome huge financial obstacles on the international and domestic levels. Do these economic conditions put large obstacles in the path of applying armament, training, and strategic planning programs on the military level?

[Nasr] In America, the Soviet Union—even before its breakup, France, and England, military expenditure has become a complex issue, but not in the small Arab or Middle Eastern nations. [passage omitted]

Advanced military arms and equipment are not the only things that require huge funds; on the contrary, there is the program to maintain them with modern technology. There is the program to train human forces with its rising costs in every country of the world. Perhaps most of us do not realize that an hour of training on aircraft varies from one airplane to another. The costs fluctuate between \$20,000 and \$30,000 an hour, and the pilot's requirement in terms of training hours also varies from one air force to another. Usually, it is not less than 20 hours a month, sometimes less. Adding it all up, we find the costs can exceed \$500,000. Therefore, it has been said that making a pilot at the end of the 20th century has become a considerable economic investment by the state in the head and body of a young man. He enters the Air Academy after passing a number of health conditions, which might not be possible for the majority of our young men. Accordingly, a great number do not succeed in entering the Air Academy and transfer to other

military colleges, which are not so restrictive in terms of health requirements, abilities, and nerve and muscular coordination, as I briefly mentioned before. During the next few years, the costs for an air academy candidate in many countries will be a million pounds, subject to increase with time.

In the Air Force, men make mighty, continuing efforts to develop the weapons available to us. They conduct comparisons among options within our resources. It is serious, scientific work. We made modifications to our Russian-built MiG-21's, to give them a new youthfulness, or rather, allowed them to carry Western "Sidewinder" missiles, giving them greater efficiency than they had before. This is but one example of the accomplishments that October expertise achieved. I cannot discuss any other details. Air Force men have continuing opportunities to practice advanced specialties with regard to aircraft armament and their delicate equipment. Their efficiency is high-level, not just "good," so that the pilot can fly his aircraft no matter what advanced technologies it has, because of the quality of his training. Factors of air command and control must be mastered within seconds in every battle, applying the military adage, "pilot before airplane." [passage omitted]

[Lutfi] The old master of fighter aircraft said to me at the conclusion of our press interview:

[Nasr] One might forget, sometimes, that performance of air crews, and ground crews of engineers, technicians, refuelers, and base and airfield administration must be counted in seconds and not minutes. Discipline is more necessary for them than for any other group that serves in the different areas of the nation. The climate of this work is not based on orders or petty regulations, but rather, on high, general morale. [passage omitted]

Discipline For Contentment

An Air Force colleague came in for a few minutes to greet Nasr. They had worked together 25 years ago. After the colleague left, Nasr came back and said to me, with a smile on his face: "A comrade of the October War."

[Nasr] When we were preparing for the October War, more than 20 years ago, none of us knew anything about the zero hour. But we were certain in our minds that it would definitely be soon. We lived at a high psychological level at all the air bases, airfields, and main offices, under the leadership of President Husni Mubarak [as published], who always wanted a high level of discipline to be present among his men on every base. In the end, he gave us what overcame the odds, for which the leaders had hoped. [passage omitted]

The successful commander, who has the resources and skills to lead men, must be marked by knowledge of human nature, the human factor, throughout periods of preparation for battle, as well as during the climax of combat.

Jailed Islamist Blasts Arab Status Quo*93AF0206A Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 19 Oct 92 p 3*

[Article by 'Abbud al-Zumur: "'Abbud al-Zumur Sounds Warning from Prison: 'Beware of Subordination to the West'"]

[Text] The die has been cast, and the Arab regime, suffering a self-inflicted mortal injury, has expired short of achieving the goals it had set for itself. These are goals which the Arab regime had claimed it would achieve in about half a century. This was a bitter experience. The Arab regime had been given a full opportunity to give its ideas a firm foothold and put them into action. What was no secret, however, was the fact that the Arab regime had an Achilles' heel: It was capable of destroying itself, and it had the wherewithal to bring about its own demise.

I contend emphatically that the Arab regime was neither truthful in what it was claiming nor serious in what it was doing. The interests of the Arab nation took a backseat to large egos and to damnable subordination. The central question of Palestine, which tops the list of the Arab regime's goals, has been removed from the route map of Arab decision makers. Some Arabs disqualified themselves by concluding a separate peace treaty; others wiped out the Palestinian resistance; and still others withheld from the Palestinians even leftover crumbs from their dining table. In fact, when Muslim men lit the fires of the valiant intifadah in a popular manifestation that outdid the impotent Arab posture, there were those who would have preferred to put out those fires instead of lending the intifadah a hand. And let us not even talk about the gravity of what happened in the Gulf: namely, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait or the manner in which the Arabs dealt with the crisis. These events confirm that the Arab regime has no vision for the future.

And now that the dust has settled at the scene of conflict and the deceased Arab regime has been laid to rest, the Arab nation finds itself in need of a way out of this crisis that resulted from the practices of the Arab regime during the foregoing period. In a nutshell, this crisis is one that manifests itself in the loss of the nation's goals and capabilities. The Jewish posture, on the other hand, has grown, and a Western military presence in the region has become conspicuous. That is why an alternate vision is imperative: We need an alternate vision that can heal the wounds of the past and bring about the hopes of the future. Only in Islam can we find this vision whose characteristics I am setting forth to the Arab people in particular and to the Islamic nation in general.

First, the thinking of all Muslims must undergo a revolution. All Muslims must realize that they are one nation and that there is no difference between an Arab and a non-Arab or between a white man and a black man. All Muslims must understand that they are one body. If one part of that body finds itself ailing, the entire body is affected and reacts with insomnia and fever. This means that the Arab nation and the Islamic nation must coalesce into one, just as ice melts in water.

Second, Muslim peoples in the various countries are being entrusted with the task of instituting the revealed laws of God and putting those leaders in charge who will use the laws of God to reform the country and improve people's conditions. This would be a first step toward establishing the institution of the Islamic Imamate over the ruins of the Arab League. In that institution member states would be tantamount to administrative districts, and that would pave the way for the total unity of these states when Muslims would come under the authority of one imam.

Third, subordination to the West has to be brought to an end, and the process of making political decisions should be liberated by achieving self-sufficiency and establishing a common Islamic market among all the Muslim countries who would then be able to stand up to past as well as recently developing economic blocs. These economic blocs are striving to use economic power to dominate and control the world.

Fourth, Islamic capital that is being held in foreign banks is to be reclaimed. Profits from these funds are being used against us by the West. These funds are to be brought back and invested in an Islamic setting for the purpose of achieving development and acquiring the means of power.

Fifth, wealth is to be redistributed and properly spent in the context of a central plan that provides for the public and private interests of Muslims. It would then be meaningless for one country that happens to share borders with the enemy to bear the burden of large costs. That burden will be borne collectively by the entire nation.

Sixth, the Islamic nation is to be reshaped according to a divine methodology that recognizes the magnitude of the challenges which the Islamic nation is facing. It would thus be induced to take action and spurred into achieving the supreme goals of Islam.

Seventh, a security strategy and a military strategy are to be established on a foundation of caution and a willingness to do battle for the cause of God. The aims of this strategy should be:

- To reorganize the armies on the various battlefronts to bring about progress for the Islamic nation and ensure its decisive victory in the areas of conflict.
- To organize an Islamic deterrent force to champion those who have been wronged and rescue those who are being held captive everywhere on earth.
- To acquire a nuclear deterrent either by having one Islamic country develop such a deterrent or by using all ways and means to purchase one regardless of the Jewish nation's claims about nuclear disarmament. After all, who made it possible for that nation to own a nuclear bomb, to own land, and to wreak havoc in the land?

- To revive martyrdom as a weapon that we can use to arm our army and our people so that victory, similar to that which was realized by the early Muslims, can be achieved. Faced with this weapon the mighty West will fall to its knees, singing the praises of Almighty God.
- To send groups and columns of people to all parts of the globe to spread the word of Almighty God, to present to people the True Religion, to make mankind yield to God's command and rule, and to spread justice and blessings throughout the world.

Finally, it is our hope that God Almighty will grant us victory. It is also our hope that the nation of Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation, will carry out this vision, particularly since the enemies of Islam have openly expressed their intentions to undermine our religion, our resources, and our land. Anyone who wishes to review this matter may read western newspapers which were published during the Gulf crisis. The Islamic nation has no other choice but to acquire the means of power so it can achieve the goals it wants to achieve in today's world, a world that is more like a jungle in which those who survive are the strongest. But what about the nation of Islam, the best and the most blessed nation? The nation of Islam is the nation that is most worthy of leadership. It is the nation that is most qualified to guide mankind to a life of righteousness and piety. It is then that the days of Khalid Bin-al-Walid and Salah-al-Din Muhammad al-Fatih will be brought back. This is not difficult for God. God is Great, and the caliphate is coming.

Professor Calls for 'Cleansing' Secular Media

93AF0209A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 14 Oct 92 p 7

[Interview with Dr. Ijlal Khalifah by Zaynab Abu Ghunaymah: "Dr. Ijlal Khalifah Talks To AL-NUR About Muslim Women: 'The Fact That Islamic Law Is Not Being Applied Is Behind the Terrorism and Destruction; Religious Extremism Does Not Exist; Our Media Must Be Cleansed and Those Whose Orientation Is Secular Must Be Removed from Our Media';" date and place of interview not given]

[Text] Dr. Ijlal Khalifah is the mother of media professionals who has dedicated herself to the education of generations of media professionals. When people with a secular orientation stood in her way, she turned to Al-Azhar and established a Department of Journalism and Islamic Media where she hoped she might realize the dream of her life.

Dr. Ijlal Khalifah, a professor of journalism at Cairo University and a lecturing professor at Arab universities, taught close to 60 percent of all media professionals in the Arab homeland. Even though she has contributed a great deal, she continues to contribute her knowledge and expertise to all people in the media and to al-Azhar University in particular.

Dr. Khalifah has incisive opinions about the application of Islamic law and about the status of women. In this interview AL-NUR sheds light on these opinions, none of which depart from the framework of her true understanding of Islam.

[AL-NUR] Dr. Ijlal Khalifah played a leading role in effecting the completion of the most serious doctoral dissertation in Egypt. She supervised a doctoral dissertation which commended AL-NUR Newspaper for its ongoing attempts to bring about the application of the canonical laws of Islam. This question which was raised by the dissertation makes me wonder: Is the immediate application of the canonical law of Islam for the purpose of reforming the conditions of society possible?

[Khalifah] I would like to say that application of the canonical law of Islam is inescapable. That day will come, and that is inevitable. The application of Islamic law is the only thing that can save us. The failure to do that will lead to more destruction and terrorism. And that is the argument made by the dissertation which was discussed at al-Azhar University. It confirmed that the canonical law of Islam must be applied so that prosperity, peace, and stability can be achieved, and the perils of war avoided.

An Unjust Position

[AL-NUR] Based on the work that you do, how would you explain the growing phenomenon of so-called extremism among young people?

[Khalifah] An important issue has to be explained here: This so-called religious extremism does not exist. The Islamic religion is clear and simple. It was revealed to a semi-illiterate society. The main problem lies in the vacuum which young people are suffering from. It is this vacuum that produces psychological instability. Also, communism and secularism made inroads and spread among young people in the universities. That led to a serious psychological conflict among young people, and that conflict was between the faith they inherited and the ideas they were hearing which belittled this faith.

It is my point of view that all groups of young Egyptians in particular and young Arabs in general are among the most virtuous of creatures. They are always looking for proper guidance to save them from confusion. They look for such guidance in an ocean that is dark and turbulent, and they can find no life boat and no captain to rescue them and save them from their predicament. Media listeners and viewers find all kinds of media programs to be very far from responding to young people's needs and issues.

The Islamic Media

[AL-NUR] Then how can the media in general and the Islamic media in particular find the solution for society's problems and for young people's problems in particular?

[Khalifah] The fundamental elements of the press in an Islamic society are very meager. When I say the press, I am talking about all media which affect the psychological, cultural, and ideological makeup of individuals. The media also exercise influence on the public by steering them [in a certain direction] and persuading them to accept enlightened ideas and proper opinions. The media have to inform Muslims about their Islamic rights and obligations. But most newspapers in the Islamic world receive most of their news from foreign news agencies which are called secular news agencies. Consequently, this news is distorted. We want an Islamic news agency that offers its press services to Muslims. We want an Islamic news agency that is intent on seeking the truth and on reporting the news honestly, impartially, and accurately.

The religious or Islamic media can make a contribution to solving society's problems in general and young people's problems in particular. This can be done by integrating Islamic states and establishing a connection between their actual needs and their available resources.

Women's Rights

[AL-NUR] Written secular works are still casting doubts about how women are viewed in the Koran. What is your opinion about this?

[Khalifah] Islam prescribed the economic domain for women. Although men, be they husbands, fathers, or brothers are financially responsible for women, Islam gave women half of what men receive in inheritance without burdening them with unlimited expenses. Islam also gave women economic independence from men.

[AL-NUR] Did Islam define what kind of work women can do?

[Khalifah] No, it did not, but the work that women do must be compatible with their intellectual and physical capabilities. Women, like men, have to answer to God for their actions. The story of Shu'ayb's two daughters sets an example. When Shu'ayb became an old man, his daughters would take the sheep to water. Moses met them [one day] and asked them, "Why are you taking the sheep to water?" They replied, "Because our father is an old man." One of them then said this to her father: "Hire him, father. It would be good to hire a strong, honest man." Now we find many women are supporting their families. If they did not work, their families would go begging.

Men and women founded human civilization. It would be unreasonable for half the labor force to remain idle.

Women in Charge

[AL-NUR] Wouldn't this contradict what the prophet said? The prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, said that a nation which puts a woman in charge of its affairs shall not succeed.

[Khalifah] I believe that this and other statements attributed to the prophet, such as the one which deems women

inferior to men in their intellectual abilities and religious faith, are not authentic because it is not possible for the prophet's tradition to contradict what the Holy Koran says. The Koran says that women and men are equal in everything. In fact, some verses of the Koran honor women when Pharoah's wife is held up as an example for all believers in all times.

[AL-NUR] Although Pharoah's wife was honored in this instance, it is the Koran itself that gave Lot's wife and Noah's wife their epithets.

[Khalifah] The story of Lot's wife and Noah's wife confirms the great regard which the Koran holds for women. This story confirms that Islamic law gave women their intellectual independence, even their ideological independence. Thus, the Koran honors women because it gave them the freedom to think and to have their own preferences.

The Islamic Media

[AL-NUR] The media have a pressing need now for professional media men who are Muslim. How can we train and develop such professionals?

[Khalifah] Muslim men in the media must receive religious training. They must study the Koran, the prophetic tradition, and the language. Besides, they must also study the science of electronic communications and they must learn how to use electronic communications equipment. They must also study mass communications and influencing the public, and that requires them to study the psychology of the media as well as behavioral science.

Institutes which promote Islam must somehow associate themselves with the science of mass communications. Muslim men in the media must be knowledgeable in religion and also in modern science.

Clerics Respond to U.S. Embassy Announcement

93AF0209B Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 15 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Majdi Zalam: "Muslim Clerics Respond to U.S. Embassy Statement; Dr Al-Sayyid Rizq al-Tawil: 'America Is Not Even-Handed;' Dr Sa'd Zalam: 'There Is a New Plan To Start Two New Wars;' Dr 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi: 'The U.S. Statement Is More Like the Letters of Ferdinand'"]

[Text] Last week AL-NUR published the text of the U.S. statement which the American Embassy in Cairo sent us. The statement articulated U.S. policy on world events which occurred in the Islamic world, and it explained America's point of view on the tyrannical war which is being waged by Serbs against the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time the statement touched upon the reason why America abandoned the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina and interfered in favor of

Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion of that country. AL-NUR presented the points made in that statement to a number of Islamic scholars to find out what they thought and what was their point of view on this matter. What did those clerics say?

Dr. Sayyid Rizq al-Tawil, dean of the College of Islamic Studies in al-Azhar University, says, "We do not deny that the West, motivated by humanitarian considerations, did take some serious positions. These positions may have been more effective than many of those taken by Islamic countries. We find no fault with the West and its positions, but we should have found fault with the Islamic Conference which failed to come up with a decisive resolution on this matter and may have been more helpless [than it should have been]."

Dr. al-Tawil goes on to wonder, "U.S. intelligence proved that Muslims were being massacred, and yet nothing was done about this blatant massacre. America is justifying its non-intervention in Bosnia by arguing that what is happening there is an internal matter. America is saying that the situation in Bosnia is not like that in Kuwait. Bosnia is more like another Lebanon. If that were the case, why then are the Americans interfering in Iraq now? Why are they interfering with Iraq's treatment of the Shi'ites? Isn't that too an internal matter?"

"America, the superpower which represents international justice, is supposed to be even-handed. It is supposed to use one standard, the standard of justice, in weighing matters."

Dr. Sa'd Zalam, former dean of al-Azhar University's College of the Arabic Language, says that America is eradicating Muslims in the name of the Serbs. If America considers what is happening there an internal matter, why then is it supplying the Croats with weapons? America is playing a very big game. It knows with certainty that Serbs have the men, the ammunition, and the weapons that make up material power. And yet, it did not interfere, arguing that what was happening there was an internal matter. America tries to put up a smoke screen whenever it finds out that the world is catching on to its plans."

Islamic Power

Dr. Sa'd Zalam affirms that America is experienced in this matter. It is making plans for two military operations between Iran and the United Arab Emirates and between Egypt and Sudan. It is also planning a military operation for Iraq, thereby striking at the heart of Islamic power. What America is saying to justify its actions is what someone would say who is trying to evade a conspiracy he himself perpetrated. America is saying that Bosnia is like another Lebanon. If that were the case, would America leave Lebanon alone?

Dr. Sa'd points out that Serbian and Croatian leaders had pledged that Bosnia would be partitioned. Unfortunately, Arabs and Muslims—47 Islamic states and 24 Arab states—were ineffective in that regard. It were as though they were

spiritless, lifeless, and powerless to provide protection. The Arabs are now exporting division to the Islamic world. We must not think well of America.

American Prisoners

Dr. 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr comments: "This is nonsense. What is being said is nothing but a lie. Why then has there been an uproar in the world when it was discovered that Iran had sent the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,000 rifles and one million rounds of ammunition? Why is Iran denied [the right] to offer these weapons? Second, Europeans and Americans were found among the Serbian prisoners. This means that individuals from America are fighting Islam among the ranks of the Serbs. Third, time did prove that the Serbs are holding American weapons in their blood-stained hands." Dr. 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr wonders, "Why didn't the Americans go to Sarajevo to do their duty there and defend the Muslims of Bosnia? Why did they move against the Muslims in Iraq and pounce on them like pythons? Why did they shower them with missiles? Why did they go to Kuwait? Why did they not respond to the appeal that was made by Muslims in Bosnia? Is it because there is oil in Kuwait and nothing in Bosnia? This is how America has revealed its ugly face to the whole world. It has shown itself to be the bitter enemy of Islam, and it has shown that Americans do not want Islam to have a viable presence in the middle of Europe."

The Statement

This statement which was issued by the American Embassy in Cairo is tantamount to a snake's deadly venom. Will Muslims continue to find American lies credible? Time has provided 1,000 pieces of evidence which show that Americans want to eradicate Islam from the inhabited world.

There Is No Oil in Bosnia

Dr. Mahmud Zaquq, dean of al-Azhar University's College of the Principles of Religion, says, "It is not true that the United States of America and the European community can do nothing about the massacres which are taking place in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They can disarm the Serbs in Bosnia, and they can prevent the Yugoslav army from reinforcing the Serbs of Bosnia. They can prevent the Serbs from flying over Bosnia just as they prevented flights over southern and northern Iraq. They can also carry out pre-emptive strikes against the Serbs' positions."

It is true that the situation in Kuwait was different since America has no interests in Bosnia. There is no oil in Bosnia that America would want to protect. And that is why the only action taken by America was action to deliver assistance and relief supplies. That is why America created quite a stir when it apprehended Iranian weapons which had been sent to the Muslims in

Bosnia even though the Serbs are being supported by the Yugoslav army and by Russia, Bulgaria, and Hungary.

"Protecting Europe from Islam"

Dr. Zaquq made it clear that the Serbs are always declaring that they were entrusted with the historical task of protecting Europe from Islam and, as they keep saying, from Islamic fundamentalism. That is why we find that America and the European community are taking no real positive action about the massacres in Bosnia. Had they wanted to, there is a great deal they could have done. This is like what happened in Croatia, a state whose ethnic groups are interrelated and whose circumstances are very close to those of Bosnia. And yet, Europe assumed a positive position there and settled the Croatian problem.

Finally, it is up to the Islamic world and the Islamic organization, whose membership includes more than 45 Islamic states, to take positive action to help Bosnia. It is up to them to provide Bosnia with funds and all the assistance it needs. It is up to the Islamic world and the Islamic organization to take serious action to stop the ethnic cleansing which is being carried out by the Serbs. Let us not forget that this plan which the Serbs want to carry out is like the one which Spain carried out against the Muslims in the past. It seems that the outcome will be the partitioning of Bosnia into three cantons: one for the Serbs, one for the Croats, and one for the Muslims.

"Disarming Bosnia"

Dr. Ja'far 'Abd-al-Salam, professor at Al-Azhar University's College of Islamic Jurisprudence and Law, agrees with Dr. Mahmud Zaquq. He affirms that America, which is holding a position of leadership in the new world order, can do a great deal. It can do what it did with Iraq: The funds in Iraq's bank accounts were confiscated, Iraqi aircraft were barred from flying over south and north Iraq, and Iraq's military force was destroyed. Unfortunately, however, there is no oil in Bosnia, and Americans and Europeans have no real interests there. In fact, Americans and Europeans are apprehensive about the spread of fundamentalism, and they are fighting it. They fear that a fundamentalist state will be established some day in the middle of Europe. That is what is worrying them and disturbing them.

He adds, "I support disarming Bosnia, provided the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims are disarmed at the same time. America can most certainly do that. It can do what it did in Croatia and position a large force to separate the forces.

"Unfortunately, however, Muslims are divided and have no clout worldwide. That is why they will see Bosnia being partitioned and a greater Serbia established. That will consist of Serbia, the Black Mountain, and all the areas in the former Yugoslavia where Serbs used to live."

Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi, president of the Institute for Islamic Advocacy, compares the statement issued by

the American Embassy in Cairo to the letters which Ferdinand wrote about the Muslims of Spain and sent to the rulers of Islamic states. "King Ferdinand had affirmed in those letters that he was not an enemy of Islam, that he was not fighting Islam, and that he would take care of Islam and of Muslims.

"Soon, however, he started the annihilation of Muslims in Spain once and for all. This is exactly what America is saying about the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is unsheathing its sword and declaring its regret that the people of Bosnia are suffering. This is what the statement makes clear."

Dr. 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi adds, "The statement indicated that the ongoing conflict or the war which is going on in Sarajevo was neither a religious war nor a war against Islam. It is rather a political struggle spurred by the Serbs' expansionist desires. America, which is the dominant superpower, should have stopped this encroachment and prevented the aggression of a powerful state against powerless people who cannot defend themselves.

"Doesn't America know that more than 130,000 Muslims were killed in these battles? Doesn't it know that women and children were killed for no other reason other than that they were Muslims?"

Shaykh Jamal Qutb has this to say about the statement: "What the American statement said about Bosnia not being like Kuwait is true. From America's point of view Bosnia is not Kuwait. For American power and for the American economy Kuwait is an oil field and a bank account. Bosnia represents nothing like that. But the statement is false when it refers to Bosnia's religious pluralism and compares Bosnia to a larger scale Lebanon. That is not true.

"Bosnia is a society of people who follow three distinct religions. One of these three religious groups is trying to devour another one, namely, Islam and the Muslims.

"Although America paid no attention to Lebanon, other forces did pay attention to the Maronites in Lebanon and strengthened their position opposite the Muslims' forces. That, however, is not the case in Bosnia where Serbs are receiving political, diplomatic, and military support from Europe and America. The Islamic side, [however,] is receiving no support and no assistance. Worldwide support for the Serbs never stopped, and the Serbs' continued aggression provides evidence of that. Diplomatic support for the Serbs is evident in the fact that the international community is being restrained and prevented from taking effective action against the Serbs. Political support for the Serbs from Europe and America is no secret. These powers are engaged in attempts to change the character of the war and to turn it into an ethnic war not a religious one.

"American aid to Bosnia is not to be considered aid in the conventional sense. I myself attended the international conference which was held in Croatia last June.

Representatives of the countries attended that conference, and each country's representative, except America's, announced what his country would offer for the cause. America's representative spoke less than everybody else, but he was faster than everybody else in shirking responsibility. He was unequivocal when he said that the American government preferred to deal with this matter through the United Nations and to have no role outside its framework. What role then will the United Nations have in this matter, and what is that role which will include one for America?"

Government's Survival Called 'Ultimate Disaster'
93AF0209C Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 27 Oct 92 p 4

[Article by 'Ismat al-Hawari: "The Survival of This Government Is the Ultimate Disaster"]

[Text] If an earthquake were to happen in Egypt and villages were destroyed, if high-rise structures crumbled and buildings cracked, and if Egypt were asked what it had done to deserve such punishment, it would rise, shake off the dust, and exclaim: "It is the impotent government that is culpable. It is the unsuccessful government that has failed and lost its way in its quest to reform the country." This is what Egypt would say and do if lives were lost, if people became homeless, if disasters became widespread, if misfortune befell us, and if we were to be hit by one disaster after another. This is what Egypt would say and do if the country were swept by torrential rains, if bridges were destroyed, and if fires raged.

It's been 15 days since the earthquake shook our country. People did not realize that we had had an earthquake. They realized, however, that this was the Day of Judgment, the day when the lifeless are brought back to life and the heavens close the books on everyone's record. In a matter of seconds the devastation brought about by the earthquake became apparent, and Egypt started mourning the dead. The earthquake had robbed everyone of his equanimity, and the gloomy terror that became widespread robbed everyone of his peace of mind. Innocent people lost their lives under the rubble, and devastation spread into every home which the earthquake had caused to crack. Schools collapsed over our children, the students, and some families sought refuge on the sidewalks. People wondered: Is this a manifestation of God's wrath? Is God angry with the people, or is the earth rebelling against its human inhabitants?

The earthquake was not the first disaster that struck Egypt; many other disasters struck before the earthquake did. The terrifying disaster of the torrential rains destroyed bridges and flooded farm land north and west of the Nile Delta, and a disastrous fire broke out in the railroads' warehouses in Bulaq, destroying all the modern equipment that was in those warehouses, equipment whose worth, according to preliminary estimates, exceeds 60 million pounds. We do not have the final

figure for the value of these losses because the government has not yet released those figures. Nor has the government announced the findings that resulted from investigating this case.

Whenever we put out one fire, another one flares up. The fire at the Heliopolis Sheraton Hotel destroyed the building in a matter of hours, and the fire in the television building turned all the equipment on entire floors into ashes. Fire broke out in one of the high-rise apartment buildings in al-Ma'adi, and firefighters were not able to put it out. Even the Information Center at the Council of Ministers did not escape the ravages of fire. A large factory in Alexandria had an accident when a boiler there blew up and a large number of workers died. Then the vessel, Salim Express, sank in the waters of the Red Sea near the Egyptian coast. These accidents are all accidents that happened one after the other, and the people know nothing about the findings that resulted from investigating them. In fact, no one is questioned about any one of these disasters, no one is held accountable for them, and they become history.

I am not trying to stir things up and become a nuisance to officials, nor am I bad-mouthing my country or gloating over an impotent government that has failed and become a disappointment. I am not adding to the disasters, catastrophes, and misfortunes that have hit us, nor am I toying with people's emotions and feelings. I am, however, sounding an alarm to wake up those who have been sleeping and alert those who have been inattentive.

I am quite certain that natural disasters are decreed by God and that we have to accept our destiny and yield to what God has decreed because we can do nothing about such disasters. At the same time, however, we have to seek prevention as our approach in confronting these disasters because prevention is better than a cure. At the very least, the present government should have monitored construction operations which disregarded the law. It should have taken action to remove the schools that were already slated for removal because they were likely to collapse. Instead, however, the government pursued a laissez-faire policy of silence and disinterest. That is why it acts only after disaster strikes, and the only remedy it can come up with then is that of the prime minister traveling to the disaster site where he proclaims his regret, offers condolences, and asks people to be patient.

What is this patience, Mr Prime Minister, which you are asking people to use as a remedy for disaster and misfortune? What did your government do to avert or mitigate these disasters? Where was the government and where were its executive agencies when buildings were constructed without permits? Where was the government and where were its monitors when poorly built schools were built by the government, indicating that manipulation, theft, and profiteering were taking place? Where was the government when deals were made for

adulterated cement and for iron whose use in construction is prohibited? Where was the government when all this was going on?

Indeed, those who hold sway over the people of Egypt are so unjust and hard-hearted, that none of them loses any sleep in his comfortable bed or worries about disaster striking the people or striking them repeatedly. It is inconceivable to me that an official who does not empathize with citizens in their misery and hardship and who does not share their pain and sorrow and do something about them can be a strong and honest official. It is inconceivable to me that such an official would not take preventive action to avoid disasters because prevention, after all, is better than any cure.

Men and women who weep and who have been the victims of disaster have exhausted all their efforts with this unsuccessful, vainglorious government. They cannot take any more of what they had to endure. They wonder about what they may have done in their lives to prolong the tenure of this government which brought us disaster and whose survival now is the ultimate disaster. This is the ultimate misfortune which befell the good people of Egypt in these vile times.

Believe me when I say that bad luck has been this government's constant companion ever since it was entrusted with our affairs. Its advent into power has been a scourge and a calamity. And the senior minister can do no more than ask people to be patient even though he realizes that patience will not bring the dead back to life and will not prevent the living from shedding tears for the homes which they lost. The prime minister knows that patience will not rebuild those villages which were destroyed or swept away by torrential rains.

Believe me when I say that there is no hope that the present government will take action which would put an end to the disasters that are striking us. But the only hope which the people of Egypt have is the hope that this government will go away. The disasters and calamities which befell us since this government came to power are more than enough.

Words To the Point

We are asking members of our government: "When will you leave office? We are being overwhelmed by disasters. When will you go away? Your misdeeds have led to one disaster after another. When will you go away? We want you to know that your departure from the scene will make the Egyptian people happy."

The greatest of all victories is that which a ruler achieves over himself. When that happens, that ruler will have scored a victory for his people.

Minister Discusses Desert Mineral Exploitation

93AF0209D Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
2 Nov 92 p 6

[Article by Mahmud Sadiq from Marsa Matruh: "Al-Banbi in Marsa Matruh: '300,000 Kilometers Covered by Exploration Agreements;' Kamal Mansur: 'Short Staple Cotton To Be Manufactured in Marsa Matruh'"]

[Text] Dr. Hamdi al-Banbi, minister of petroleum and mineral resources, announced that 300,000 square kilometers were covered by oil exploration agreements and that more exploration agreements were still needed to cover the rest of Egypt, an area of 700,000 kilometers.

The minister was visiting Badr-al-Din fields with the Parliamentary Committee on Industry and Energy. The group was headed by Dr. Amin Mubarak, the chairman of the committee. During his visit to the oil fields the minister affirmed that Egyptian investment in oil exploration was being encouraged. He affirmed that favorable terms and significant benefits were being given to Egyptian investors and that efforts would be made to protect them from the risks which foreign investors take upon themselves. Besides, Egyptian investors would be given the same rights and privileges which are given to foreigners who bring with them the latest technological developments in exploration.

Al-Banbi made it clear that Egypt's natural gas reserves did not exceed 13 trillion cubic feet. In Iran, however, those reserves are 635 trillion. That is why an appeal is being made for more agreements.

He said that 13 million barrels of crude oil and 78 billion cubic feet of natural gas have been produced at a cost of \$420 million since production in Badr-al-Din field started two years ago. Al-Banbi mentioned that 39 million barrels of oil have been produced from the Badr-al-Din fields where reserves amount to 26 million barrels. Five areas in the Mediterranean, an area of 17.8 kilometers, are being explored.

Kamal Mansur, the governor of Marsa Matruh, announced that 1,000 feddans east of Marsa Matruh have been set aside for processing short staple cotton. This is being done so that the pests which come with the cotton do not enter the country and destroy Egypt's long staple cotton whose quality is known worldwide. Mr Mansur also announced that a shearing plant will be built so that sheep's wool can be put to good use.

The government called upon oil companies to look for water so that wheat and other crops can be cultivated in thousands of feddans because Marsa Matruh occupies an area that is one fourth the area of all Egypt.

Earthquake Viewed as Opportunity for Major Change

93AF0209E Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 3 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Justice Sharif Kamil: "The Earthquake and the Real Tragedy in Egypt"]

[Excerpts] We are still saying that the earthquake which happened on black Monday revealed clearly that conditions in Egypt are rotten to the core. It is inconceivable, in fact, that these conditions could remain as rotten as they have been or that the disintegration from within could go on any further. That is why the earthquake itself should have been enough to make everyone in Egypt call for "glasnost," that is, a candid disclosure of all conditions in Egypt. Everyone in Egypt should also have called for "perestroika," that is, for the reorganization of all conditions in Egypt. This should start with reforming foundering economic conditions and alleviating the pain that is caused by hunger, unemployment, and widespread oppression and corruption. Reorganization should end with the reform of intellectual, mental, ideological, cultural, and political conditions so that we can uncover what kind of a cultural identity we have and reach a general agreement over a national plan behind which we would all stand together so that we can make it happen.

In Egypt, however, we are being distracted by talking about the earthquake, the victims, and those who have been hurt and affected by the earthquake. Although everyone who has been hurt by the earthquake and affected by it needs attention and has demands that must be met immediately, everyone missed the point which was made by the earthquake: The earthquake itself was a "possible" opportunity to do something that would be much bigger than merely housing and compensating those who suffered damages as a result of the earthquake. It was a "possible" opportunity to review with honesty and candor the various conditions of our life in Egypt in general and to disclose and reveal the findings of this review. But as is usual in Egypt the "possible" opportunity which may have escaped everyone in the first place, was lost. Consequently, no one took advantage of it, and no one understood it. I imagine, therefore, that no one in Egypt regrets the loss of this opportunity.

The Real Disaster

Notwithstanding the ferocity of the earthquake which struck on black Monday and notwithstanding how repugnant the decay, the rot, and the disintegration from within of all conditions in Egypt are, the real disaster in our judgment is that a "possible" opportunity to pause, to reflect, and to review all the conditions of our disintegrating life in Egypt was missed. No one noticed the existence of this "possible" opportunity to change all conditions in society. Official statements were trying to paint a rosy picture of conditions in Egypt—and this is quite normal and understandable—and television as well as government newspapers were trying to persuade us by means of splendid colored pictures that these colored pictures were true representations of life in Egypt—and that too is quite normal and quite understandable. After all, these statements and these pictures implement the government's political approach to information (or more precisely, to advertising) whose aim is to promote a certain image, numb the senses, and make people forget.

And yet, in spite of the official statements, it was impossible to hide the conditions of hunger, poverty,

unemployment, and corruption which have reached into all locations. It was impossible to hide these conditions in spite of television's attempts and in spite of attempts made by the government's remaining political advertisement agencies. Who in Egypt does not know and does not understand economic failure? Who in Egypt does not know about political futility? Who in Egypt does not know that legality, constitutionality, and laws are nonexistent? Who in Egypt does not know and does not understand the social and moral decline that has taken place? Who in Egypt does not understand the sense of hopelessness that people feel? People from various social classes have no hope that they can lead an honorable life. It is only the class of new Mamelukes and their hired staff, the loyal guards, and those who benefit from their association and subordination to them who have hopes of a better life. Who in Egypt does not know about all this decay, corruption, and disintegration from within? Who in Egypt does not understand that conditions in the country are falling apart?

No one in Egypt can deny that Egypt has no national plan. No one in Egypt can deny that there is a lack of confidence and a lack of certainty about everything including the reality of a cultural identity. No one in Egypt can anticipate what the near future will look like or what will become of the deteriorating conditions in Egypt. If these are the indisputable conditions in Egypt—the conditions that we all feel, know about, understand, and talk about in our private get-togethers—why then was the "possible" opportunity which was presented by the earthquake missed? Why did we miss the opportunity to review, change, and correct all conditions in Egypt? Why was this opportunity missed and why is it that no one became aware that this "possible" opportunity existed?

The fact that no one realized or understood that this "possible" opportunity existed is the real disaster. Next to it, the earthquake, any earthquake, even one that may have been many times more powerful than this one which occurred on black Monday, is a disaster that pales by comparison. What this real disaster means quite clearly is that the life of everyone in Egypt is being snuffed out. It means mass death in Egypt, and that is absolutely worse than anything with which any nation can be afflicted. A nation so afflicted, no matter how populous it is, becomes lifeless and motionless. Accordingly, it may just as well be dead and nonexistent. It is a nation without hope and without a future. After all, the dead have no hope, and they have no future. Who is it that snuffed the life out of the land of Egypt? [passage omitted]

IRAQ

Federation Idea Called Legitimate Right of Kurds

93AE0123A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 29 Oct 92
p 18

[Article by Mumtaz Mufti, head of Kurdish Human Rights Organization in Britain: "Federation of Iraqi Kurdistan Legitimate Right of Kurds"]

[Text] One must consider the Kurds' desire for self-determination, including the proclamation of a federation in Iraqi Kurdistan, not merely as a legitimate right, but as the only way to develop real cohesion and brotherhood among the peoples of the region and as a prelude to stability and security. Without it, the tragedies and disturbances will continue. The Kurdish issue is no longer, as it once was, a local or internal issue. It has become an international issue. The divided Kurdish population has the right to enjoy its national rights like the other peoples of the earth, including the right to live within its own independent political entity. This is a matter that may not be evaded or viewed from a blind, chauvinistic perspective.

The Kurdish issue is not a new one. Its roots do not go back to the beginning of the current century, as some imagine; it is much older than that. Kurdish emirates and kingdoms emerged within the Ottoman and Persian empires and enjoyed autonomy until World War I and the division of the world into spheres of influence and entities, the drawing of boundaries, and the emergence of modern states, including Iraq. Although the Treaty of Sevres granted the right to establish a Kurdish state in 1920, a right that the League of Nations confirmed, southern Kurdistan was annexed in 1925 to Iraq at Britain's request, instead of assuming its independence like the remaining nations within the Ottoman empire. However, the League of Nations imposed a condition on Iraq, which was then under British mandate, requiring that autonomy be granted to Iraqi Kurdistan. The first constitution of the new state declared that Iraq was inhabited by two peoples: the Arab people and the Kurdish people. But with the arrival of new regimes, their rulers denied the Kurds this right. They viewed the struggle of the Kurds to build their political and cultural entity and win their national rights as objectionable, indeed, as an unforgivable crime. The states that divided Kurdistan think that repression and willful disregard of Kurdish reality and Kurdish existence are the only possible way to solve the Kurdish problem. They think that repressing the Kurds, silencing their voices, burning their cities and villages, and using chemical weapons, mass extermination, and pillaging operations might mean escape from the Kurdish issue, but reality says otherwise. Arab brethren, both in Iraq and in the Arab world, are called upon to take a serious interest in the Kurds and their just cause. They are called upon to reject the policy of ignoring, overlooking, and denying rights and tragedies. For the Arabs to stand by as spectators of the tragedies of the Kurdish people and the disasters the Iraqi dictatorship has inflicted on the Kurdish people contradicts all Islamic values and the requirements of Arab-Kurdish brotherhood. Here we must call attention to the popular uprising in Iraqi Kurdistan in March 1991 to do away with the bloody dictatorship in Baghdad and to the mass emigration of the Kurdish people. We found no Arab Red Crescent among the organizations that rushed to the aid of the refugees and the homeless, no Arab organization among the international humanitarian organizations that were formed to defend the

rights of the Kurdish people. Arabs and Kurds have fought in the same trench since ancient times: the conquests of the Kurdish commander Salah-al-Din the Ayyubid are the best proof of this. Yet the totalitarian Iraqi regime, which is based on sectarianism, racism, monopolization of Iraqi nationalism by the regime, and the absence of democracy, is deepening the Kurds' feeling of alienation and detachment from the Iraqi identity. If we reviewed the behavior of successive Iraqi regimes toward the Kurdish people since the foundation of Iraq in 1921, we would find that the hallmark of that behavior has been repression, persecution, banishment, and deprivation of the most basic human, cultural, and social rights by the most hideous extermination campaign that humanity has ever seen.

Governments that long were silent toward such crimes were unable to stifle the cry of their peoples or prevent their sympathy as they watched the tragedy of mass flight on the television screens. So for the first time since the Treaty of Sevres, the world spoke a second word of justice toward the Kurds when Security Council Resolution 688 was passed, explicitly condemning the repression of the Kurds, and when, in its wake, a safe zone was established in part of Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish people have expressed their good intentions by accepting every initiative to solve their problem, despite the sufferings, tragedies, and extermination campaigns to which they have been subjected. But in all cases they have been met with treachery, betrayal, and shirking of signed agreements. Now there are Arab positions calling for the need to maintain the unity of Iraq, it being the right of the Iraqi people alone to determine their destiny within whatever political regime they want. Yet the Kurds, who are part of the Iraqi people, never have been asked their view about the regime and political structure they want. Therefore, there is an urgent need to break down the thick wall of mistrust and misunderstanding that separates Kurds and Arabs. Our Arab brothers ought to welcome this federation.

Kurdish Federation Idea Discussed, Analyzed

Effect on National Opposition

93AE0127A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 19 Nov 92
p 17

["Reciprocal Recognition of Self-Determination; the Iraqi Opposition and the Federal Plan" by Nizar Aghri, a Kurdish researcher"]

[Text] The Kurds have had bitter experiences with the successive governments and regimes of the countries among which Kurdistan is divided. When the Kurds experienced calamities at the hands of a dictatorial regime here or there, they looked to the next era, in which a new regime would take the place of the despotic one. They would take part, in varying degrees, in the new regime's rise to power. But as soon as the new situation

was in place and the regime had consolidated its position, the situation became troubled again, and conflict broke out.

There are many examples, from Ataturk's Turkey and the founding of the Iraqi state, to Saddam Husayn and the gas attacks. In Iran, the Kurds sighed with relief with the departure of the Shah, having taken part in the revolution against him; but it was not long before they began to long for his era, once they experienced the oppression of the "Islamic" Republic, which added them to its list of Satans. The Kurds, particularly in Iraqi Kurdistan, are pinning their hopes on the Iraqi opposition, which is trying to oust Saddam Husayn from power.

The situation is that Iraqi Kurdistan looks to the Iraqi opposition to prove, for once and for all, that "all's well with the world" and that there are those who will deal with their cause and their hopes justly and impartially. The Iraqi opposition did not go public until after the Gulf war. Extraordinary events served to prepare the way for it to appear, suitcases in hand, here and there. Within two years, this opposition, with the energetic participation of the Kurdistan Front, has held several meetings before the Irbil meeting, without success.

The Iraqi opposition has a tool ready as regards the Kurdish national question, but this tool is shrouded in mystery, confusion, and doubt. There are many slogans that that nearly nothing can shake, which are the concepts all Iraqi governments have passed down, considering them to be the supports of its desired structure. Most prominent among these slogans are: national unity, equality for all, and nonintervention in internal affairs, but they have also recently begun to speak of the Kurds' right to self-determination. Let us look at this program:

1. Iraqi National Unity

The opposition regards this as a sacred point that may not be questioned, whose sanctity may not be touched. Almost no one knows the practical concrete form of this national unity, nor does anyone know, or say, why things have to be this way. But if the leaders of the Iraqi opposition are political and diplomatic men, dealing with realistic data, or so they allege, then they are compelled, as is any political group, to explain, analyze, and justify these issues. But they do not do that, to our surprise, nor do they justify their actions and decisions (as far as the Kurdish question is concerned) in a realistic political manner. The Kurds are partners in the nation—or so it is said. They are a pillar of national unity. But we know that this partnership is deceptive and delusive, for national unity was imposed upon them. They were forced within the borders of many countries against their will; they were from Kurdistan before Britain decided to assimilate them into Iraq, whose interests it suited them to establish. But as long as things went this way, and Iraq and part of Kurdistan merged as a result of external partition, it was. But facts are still facts, and what occurred in exceptional circumstances, and cannot occur in others, does not become a national accomplishment

and eternal merit. Even so, national unity means the unity of Iraq and Kurdistan, and this must show in all the issues of civil society: politics, the economy, society, and culture.

This logic of the issues requires, for example, that there be a rotating presidency of the country, and that the Arabic and Kurdish languages both have equal and official status. It requires that the budget be balanced equally between Iraq and Kurdistan, so that Kurdistan may be transformed from a pit of misery and poverty into an Iraqi Catalonia. But the Iraqi opposition does not see it this way; it follows the previously-laid track, set out by successive governments on the basis of hegemony and the sovereignty of the "Arab nation," and their monopolization of the political process. Despite this, why do the Arabs have to give the Kurds autonomy? Why doesn't the principle embrace both sides?

2. The Partition of Iraq and the Issue of Internal Affairs

In every treatment of the Kurdish issue in Iraq, the talk turns away from the "horror" of the partition of Iraq. This has become tantamount to a sword over the heads of the Kurds. Any political action in which they engage, any movement, call, or demand they make, becomes a "plot" aimed at the partition and disintegration of Iraq, and nothing more. What is meant by the partition of Iraq is the likelihood of Kurdistan's secession from Iraq and the establishment of a Kurdish state. Division, like any other phenomenon of societies, is a possible, real thing. When its formative elements are in place, and it becomes essential, then it must blaze its trail in the face of all difficulties. The wise policy is the one that foresees the transformation through its causes, or that which eases it in order to avoid losses and casualties, making it into a positive and productive factor leading to security and stability and paving the way for development, civilization, and peace, instead of the opposite.

The Iraqi opposition, however, rejects the right of self-determination if it should lead to the secession of Kurdistan, because that, in itself, would lead to the partition of Iraq. But the opposition does not only reject partition. It rejects antagonizing neighboring countries, which fear the spread of the infection to their own portions of Kurdistan. The question looms: If the Iraqi opposition rejects outside interference, and acts independently, taking people's interests into consideration, then what are others doing formulating its policy and implementing its program? Doesn't that mean permitting outside parties to interfere in Iraq's internal affairs? In order for the Kurds to enjoy their rights, is it necessary for the opposition to take into consideration the opinions of Turkey, Iran, or others? Whether the fear is of maintaining national unity, or causing the partition of Iraq, it has nothing to do with rejecting the Kurds' right to self-determination.

3. The Right to Self-Determination

In the Vienna conference, the Iraqi opposition offered, for the first time, to recognize a fact that should have

been established a long time ago: the Kurdish people's right to self-determination. But the dream dissolved into another illusion, as the opposition takes away with its left hand what it gives with its right: it recognizes the Kurds' right to self-determination, but on one condition, which is that they do not exercise it. The opposition will take over their self-determination for them, in advance. It is true that the question to raise, even if in a purely formal way, is: Why must Iraq not be partitioned? Both ruling out this question and fearing it is not a sign of political well-being, for people do not fear something that does not exist. Any political movement must take into consideration that which accomplishes people's interests and aspirations. Since the opposition theoretically represents the actual interests of the society that exists in the Iraqi state, this means that its attention to Kurdish interests is what makes it accept their remaining within the existing borders.

Is this the way it is? The evidence indicates that the opposition looks upon the Kurds as customers haggling to buy some commodity, not as a people living on historic land with a national identity, national interests, and a desire to establish its independent political entity. Dealing takes place on the basis of a central vision which views the Kurds as a factor that shakes up the historical distinction accorded by former colonial powers for one side, for equilibrium, at the expense of the other side. If the opposition was truly attentive to the interests, security and prosperity of the Kurdish people, it would have left them the freedom to determine their own fate. In fact, it would have demanded, more than the Kurds themselves, a Kurdish national entity in which they could pursue their independence on an equal footing with the rest of the peoples of the region.

Both the governments and the opposition have reawakened feelings of oppression and fear among the Kurds. They have persisted in viewing the Kurds as followers, not as equal partners with full rights. That is why the Kurds look around in fear and shame as they ask for their right of self-determination. They feel as if they are committing a sin. Whenever you approach them, you see them swear for all the world to see that they do not want to secede. But who ever said that Kurdish secession and the establishment of a Kurdish state would bring harm to the people of Iraq and the Arab nation? Did annexation by force and coercion cause harm, or the maintenance of the misery of tension and unrest in the heart of the Arab nation, any less than the harm of the birth of a state or confederation, as a barrier to the export or instigation of civil wars?

Legal Implications Positive

93AE0127B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 10 Nov 92
p 18

["Iraqi Kurdistan: Can Federalism Correct Something Worse: Autonomy?" by Riyad al-Zuhayri, Professor of Common Law in London]

[Text] The Kurdish Parliament in Iraq has confused and perplexed the Iraqi opposition with its resolution (4 October 1992) to establish a federal government in the region of Iraqi Kurdistan. The resolution came after a meeting of the opposition's factions in Kurdistan from 23-27 September, when reactions among opposition ranks ranged from rejection to acceptance to hesitation.

It appears that this resolution served to counter the opposition, which still was hesitating to adopt a clear and forthright position on the Kurdish question, with an accomplished fact, with the goal of confirming that the autonomy formula had become obsolete and inadequate to satisfy the ambitions of the Kurdish people of Iraq.

This parliament based its decision on the international charters that accord the peoples of the world the right to self-determination, and on the closing statements of the opposition's conferences in Vienna and Kurdistan, which declared their acceptance of this right within the framework of a unified Iraq.

As for the Iraqi opposition, some of them announced their support for this resolution, seeing it as contributing to the democratic goals for which the opposition is fighting. Others declared their rejection of the resolution, seeing it as a step toward the partition and fragmentation of Iraq at a time when other forces are wary, seeing the resolution's timing as unfortunate—attention should be chiefly focused on bringing down Saddam Husayn. Still others view the matter as requiring the consensus of the Iraqi people.

In spite of this difference, everyone shares a limited understanding of the federal system, though everyone does not understand this federal system that they reject or support. The Kurdish parliament's statement was weak in terms of legal establishment, as it relied upon international covenants in issuing the resolution, whereas the desired federal system has an existing internal legal link based on the Iraqi constitution and legal code, not international law. Those international covenants may justify the legitimacy of this resolution, but it is not right to depend upon them to establish it. This resolution also relies upon the closing statements of Iraqi opposition conferences already referred to, lest these conferences not be considered fit international, domestic, constitutional or legal authorities upon which the Kurdish parliament may rely in taking this momentous decision. In addition, this action strips this decision of its legislative force and turns it into a political decision. This is what the parliament—whose jurisdiction is confined to issuing legislative decisions, not political decisions—does not claim, in addition to the fact that descending to the level of this decision, to the level of the local legislative level, will make it liable to nullification or amendment by any higher constitutional or legislative institution.

Therefore, I believe that this action, upon which the parliament relied, was one of the principal reasons that moved some of the opposition forces to declare their

rejection, or caution, regarding this resolution, in addition to the lack of clarity of the federal idea on the part of these powers, and their misunderstanding of the limits of the federal system.

Why Do the Kurds Refuse?

The formula of Kurdish autonomy in Iraq is linked to the 1974 law enacted in light of the constitutional, legal and political climate, which consolidated the autocracy of the central government and the hegemony of the single [political] party. That is why the law was no exception to that milieu, and even helped the central government and provided it with the complete circumstances for taking away rights previously granted the Kurds in past eras. The government employed—for this purpose—a technical legal concept to formulate the subtext of the law in such a way as to strip autonomy of its true concept, preserving it in name without its substance, as the following makes clear:

1. This law does not define, in its text, the precise legal concept of autonomy. It considers Kurdistan "one administrative unit," not a regional political unit; this is why the law insists on calling Kurdistan an "area" and not a "region," which results in the restricting of the concept of autonomy to administration only, rather than governance (paragraphs 5-24 of the law). Jurists, however, know that autonomy is not merely a formula for autonomy, but a form of government as well.

2. No part of the law refers to the principle of "personal independence," which is considered a central element in the concept of autonomy. The law emphasizes, in several passages, the principle of the unity of the state, while this concept requires the recognition of the two principles and the specification of factors that accompany them.

4. [as published] Clauses 12, 15, and 16 of the law specify the scope and jurisdictions of the autonomy councils, which are very limited and not open to expansion or growth, according to the content of Article 16 above, which views all jurisdictions and powers deriving from them outside the scope of what is defined in Articles 12 and 15 pertaining to the central government. Add to that the fact that this law did not mandate the cancellation of any wording or resolution in conflict with the provisions contained in it. This opens a huge legal loophole for the central government to backtrack and reduce the jurisdictions of these councils.

5. An examination of the legal force of the legislative council's decisions, which represent a support for this law, convinces us that they are no more than administrative decisions, whose status never reaches the legislative level. The law accords it a status inferior to that of the system issued by the central government, which confirms that this council does not have legislative rank; it is an administrative committee, whose decisions may be nullified or amended by any central committee.

6. This law requires that candidates for membership on the autonomy councils be "Iraqi, born to two Iraqi-born

parents." Further, it stipulates the inadmissibility of nominating any Iraqi born to two Iraqi parents, either or both of whom may have acquired Iraqi citizenship through the right of residence or naturalization. In addition to that, the condition requires that the candidate be an Iraqi Kurd, or from the region of Kurdistan, which led, in practice, to the entry of non-Kurds and Kurds from elsewhere than that region into these councils, because of their loyalty to the central government and the ruling party, especially as the law does not stipulate that the candidate should read and write the Kurdish language. Any "Iraqi" who can read and write "either" Arabic or Kurdish can be nominated.

For all that, a return to an autonomy formula for the self-determination of the Kurdish people of Iraq has become linked to the fear that this formula itself has produced this law. The concept of autonomy has taken root in the minds of all Iraqis, not the Kurds alone, with this image traced by the 1974 law. For all that, it mandated a pulling back from this formula and a search for an alternative to reassure the Kurds, bearing in mind that the experiences of countries that had used systems of autonomy to solve their ethnic questions demonstrated the futility and failure of this system. Therefore, my view is that it is the Iraqi opposition's duty to give serious thought to developing their plan for solving the Kurdish question in Iraq, and staying away from ambiguous and dilatory formulas. They should enact a solid solution based upon a federal system.

The declaration of federal rule by the Kurdish parliament made Iraqi citizens wonder, "What is this rule? Does it fall into the category of fragmenting and partitioning Iraq as some Iraqi opposition forces claim, who reject the declaration or regard it with caution? Or will it achieve cohesion among the Iraqi people's communities and factions, as the opposition forces claim who announced their support for the declaration?"

We must acknowledge from the outset that federal rule is not a formula that relies upon an international order or international treaty. Nor does it get into the jurisdiction of public international law. It is a formula for a system of government that rests upon the bases of the domestic laws of any given country that enacts it. For this reason, the declaration stated that the parliament had resolved upon federal rule in Kurdistan within the context of a unified Iraq.

Based on that, the region that enjoys this rule does not have the attributes of a state, as defined by international law, nor does it attain international recognition in the precise legal sense as the term "recognition" is commonly understood in that law. Federal rule would, however, become an internal legal link set out and defined by the country's constitution and basic statutes. In this way, the concept of autonomy overlaps with the concept of federal rule, while both concepts differ from a confederation, which has an international legal link based on an international treaty or accord between the countries that make up the confederal union.

Autonomy also resembles federal rule in its precise legal concept, in the sense that they both make the region "a political-regional unit," making them distinct from the concept of administrative decentralization, whose role is limited to organizing administrative units inside a framework of the country's administrative system.

Considering the region a political-regional unit leads to recognition of its political entity, and thus not merely the recognition of a system of administration, but of a system of governance also, which certainly results in the extension of the exercise of government in this region by its institutions at the legislative, executive, and judicial levels. This is the essence of personal independence, considered a basic element in defining the concepts of autonomy and federal rule. Thus stripping these forms of government of this basic element—in any way whatsoever—renders them meaningless and insignificant.

The other point at which autonomy overlaps with federal rule is represented through the exercise of governance and administration in the region within a framework of the principle of the unity of the state, as both forms of government are based on balance and coordination between the principle of personal independence of the region and the principle of the unity of the state. There can be no talk of the precise legal concept of these two forms of government if we subtract from them the principle of the unity of the state. The existence of this principle is inseparable from the principle of independence.

This balance and coordination between the two principles exists in the framework of a legal system which defines the extent of the relation between them, that is, the extent of the relationship between the region's institutions and the central government. This relationship is not an authoritarian one or a hegemonistic administrative mandate, due to its being the central government imposing its mandate on the region's institutions, as is the case with the system of decentralized administration. Nor is it an international legal relationship that takes over the process of coordination between parties to an international treaty, as in a confederal union. It is an internal legal relationship between two parties (the region and the center) in one state, systematized by the constitution, which defines the reciprocal rights and duties of each of the two sides. It also gives the judiciary the right to monitor them equally. Here, on this point, the difference is clear between the concepts of autonomy and federal rule: it is a difference relating to the extent of the relationship between the region and the center, not the range of the existence of that relationship.

With autonomy, the relationship between the region and the center is defined on the basis of the principle of restricting the jurisdictions of the region in the constitution or the law; what falls outside the scope of these jurisdictions is in the province of the central authority, with the following results:

1. The region's institutions are confined to those jurisdictions defined for it. Thus, all its decisions falling

outside the scope of these jurisdictions are considered null and void under the law; the judiciary may intervene to cancel or nullify them, according to the circumstances.

2. The inadmissibility of the region's jurisdictions expanding or growing, because every new jurisdiction would be the province of the central government, under the constitution or the law.

3. The principle of narrow interpretation will apply in the interpretation of the basis of the region's jurisdictions, which opens a legal loophole for the central government to reduce or eliminate jurisdictions accorded the autonomous region's institutions.

Federal rule is distinct from autonomy in the way jurisdiction is distributed among the the region and the center; this way depends upon the restriction of the central government's jurisdictions on a constitutional, rather than legislative, basis. What falls outside this scope becomes the jurisdiction of the institutions of federal rule. The experience of federal states in this field demonstrates that the constitution must explicitly and precisely define the fields reserved for the central government. It specifies the field of the state's foreign relations, foreign defense, currency, basic strategic sectors, etc., according to what is attained by the constitutional council that puts forth the constitution. In this regard, there must be no expansion in these jurisdictions in such a way as to make the concept of federal rule tantamount to autonomy. The following are derived from this system:

1. The region's jurisdictions will be subject to expansion and growth in accordance with the local needs of the region.

2. The principle of broad definition will apply in the interpretation of the jurisdictions of the region's institutions, while the principle of narrow definition will apply in the interpretation of the central government's jurisdiction.

3. The restriction of jurisdiction on a constitutional basis grants broad legal protection to the federal rule's institutions from hostilities on the part of the central government.

We thus confirm that federal rule for Iraqi Kurdistan would have benign and positive results for managing the helm of government in Iraq. It is not a means of secession from the mother country, nor does it tear down the pillars of state unity, as long it does not reach the level of a confederal union.

The experience of countries that have used this authority has proven that this form of government has helped to strengthen a country's unity while allowing regions to administer and rule themselves within the framework of a democratic constitution.

JORDAN

Reports Assess IMYO Case Results, Impact

Sentiments After Royal Pardon

93AE0155A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
18 Nov 92 pp 22-27

["The Islamic Political Movement in Jordan; the New Situation after the Pardon of Shubaylat and Qirrish"]

[Excerpts] Even moments before the sentence of 20 years in prison with hard labor was handed down against Jordanian parliamentary deputies Layth Shubaylat and Ya'qub Qirrish on Tuesday, the eighth of this month, there was a widely-held conviction among Jordanians that King Husayn would intervene at the proper moment.

According to information circulating in Jordan, King Husayn had promised the major defendant's brother, Dr. Ghayth Shubaylat, whom he met two days before the sentences were to be handed down against his brother and his colleague Ya'qub Qirrish, that he would intervene at the proper moment, and that he would use his constitutional prerogatives, either to stop the trial because of the lack of jurisdiction of the court looking into the case, or to close the matter entirely. Because this information was widely circulated, even though the Jordanian press did not print it, observers, like the families of Shubaylat and the other accused men, were surprised by the sentences' being handed down in this way, as it meant the end of the political lives of the deputies, one of whom, the first defendant, was considered one of the most active parliamentarians known to Jordan's parliamentary experiment.

The major problem raised by the sentence against deputies Shubaylat and Qirrish was that canceling their membership in the parliament would have required the votes of two-thirds of the body's members. It is known that the Muslim Brotherhood bloc and its backers, who number about 30 of the 80 members of parliament, with the bloc of leftists and nationalists whose numbers approach 15, were sympathetic to the two deputies' cause, and went so far as to say that what was happening to them was a "matter of trickery." [Passage omitted]

Division and Opinions

Jordanian public opinion received the sentences with anxiety and a kind of dissatisfaction. There was near unanimity among all established political parties, which had not yet formed the country's democratic impulse, that the sentences were tantamount to shaking a stick at them and their leaders and their perceptions; that there was a red line, and limits. But this was not the feeling among conservative deputies, who had dwindled in comparison to the two parliamentary blocs, the Constitutional bloc and the National bloc. These conservatives stood, from the beginning, against the two deputies, and supported, to varying degrees, their arrest and trial, given their belief that the charge directed against them

was just, as they had been planning to overthrow the current regime and change the country's constitution by force.

Some go so far as to say that the group under former Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i were previously accused by parliamentarians, including deputies Shubaylat and Qirrish, of holding "carnival-style" festivities directly after the handing down of the verdicts, and exchanging greetings after the national security court sentenced the two chief defendants to 20 years in prison with hard labor. However, with these exception of these persons, the sentencing moved most people, particularly in nationalist and Islamic circles, to make major reconsiderations.

It must be said, for the sake of clarification, that the climate of Jordanian public opinion has undergone a major change since the start of this case—that is, from late August until now. In the beginning, there was a general consensus against the deputies, and there was a firm belief that they were "plotters" in contact with foreign powers. But with the trial having dragged on that long, there was a partial change.

It was possible, during the Islamists' court sessions, to minimize the case, to hear that "something" had pushed the case to these limits, that it was unreasonable for the government to fear an organization with a membership that could be counted on the fingers of one hand, and to charge it with seeking to overthrow the government. The Jordanian people had renewed its oath of loyalty to the Jordanian ruler in an unparalleled manner when he came home from the United States after undergoing surgery there.

The Shubaylat Case

Some exactitude is required to point out that the sympathy felt by some was confined to Deputy Layth Shubaylat alone. The general impression of Ya'qub Qirrish was that he had numerous shadowy connections, and that some of his behavior raised many questions. [Passage omitted]

Perhaps what heated up the atmosphere between the two sides was that Jordan's security agencies, at the same time that they were investigating the Islamic Mobilization Youth Organization [IMYO], seized quantities of arms at the home of the second-highest official of a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in al-Zarqa', which the second-largest city in Jordan, located about 25 kilometers east of Amman. Informed observers say that the Jordanian Government, eager to avoid an explosion with the Muslim Brotherhood, dealt with the al-Zarqa' arms differently than it had dealt with IMYO's arms. While it handed the latter case over to the state security court, the former case did not go any farther than any other ordinary criminal case. [Passage omitted]

Peaceful Solution

Whatever these views—and their veracity—may be, the common impression in Jordanian political circles is that the government wanted to obstruct any attempt to toy with the security of the country, particularly at this critical juncture. Government sources say that Jordan is open to nearly everyone, and that had it not been for the alertness and preparedness of the security agencies, it might have found itself trapped in a Lebanese-type or Somali-style cycle, or the bloody, ongoing cycle now being experienced by Bosnia-Herzegovina.

What perhaps heightened the government's fears and made it sensitive to any security question, such as the IMYO case or the "Muhammad's Army" case before that, was that large quantities of arms came into Jordan after the Gulf war and the collapse of the Iraqi army.

Briefs Show IMYO History

93AE0155B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
18 Nov 92 pp 24-25

["IMYO Born in Iran; Shubaylat Organized and Qirrish Recruited"]

[Excerpts] The memorandum sent by the public prosecutor, military judge Major Muhannad Hijazi, to the State Security Court, included the following:

"The accused, both the first (Layth) and the second (Ya'qub) are involved in a relationship whose origins go back to 1975. They were, at that time, followers and supporters of Shaykh Hazim Abu-Ghazalah, leader of the Shadhliyah-Duqawiyah Sufi order known as Dar al-Koran. They remained involved in the order until 1985, when they split from Dar al-Koran after devising a path of political action that most certainly conflicted with the Sufi order, and followed a special political path.

In 1990, the first accused (Layth) left Amman for Tehran to attend an international conference in support of the Islamic uprising. It was also attended by Muslim political parties and organizations. Behind the scenes at the conference, meetings were held under the supervision of the highest political leadership in Iran. These meetings included the first accused, Layth; the Secretary General of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command [PFLP-GC], Ahmad Jibril; representatives of Jihad [NFI]; al-Jihad Squads [saraya al-jihad]; al-Tawhid; Hizballah; the Islamic Liberation Front, and others.

An agreement was reached in this meeting to establish other religious organizations in the Arab countries surrounding Israel, including Jordan, with the aim of demolishing the existing regimes and setting up a system for an Islamic caliphate in these countries, including Jordan, to fit in with the principles and aims of the Iranian revolution. They agreed that these movements and organizations should act under the cover of working for jihad in the cause of God and the liberation of the occupied territories. In accordance with the decisions of

this conference, it was decided for the first defendant, Layth, to found a religious organization in Jordan, with the coordination of the second defendant, Ya'qub, to be called the Islamic Mobilization Youth Organization. Its primary goal would be to promote the goals and principles of the Iranian revolution in Jordan, in preparation for overthrowing the existing governing system and establishing an Islamic caliphate state there. It was agreed that the movement would be funded by Iran and through the PPFLP-GC. It was agreed that IMYO's activity would take two courses: Jordanian, to be handled by Layth in Jordan, and Palestinian, to be handled by the second defendant, Ya'qub, in the West Bank.

Roles were assigned among the accusees, with the first defendant serving as an official managing the organization secretly, while the role of the second, Ya'qub, would be to recruit members for the organization by using his connections in Jordan and inside the occupied territories, in addition to his connections with Palestinian organizations and the PLO. He was indeed able to do this, and in early 1991, the third (Ahmad) and fourth ('Abd-al-Hamid) defendants were recruited and indoctrinated. He met with them several times at his residence in Jabal al-Husayn in Amman. They all decided to proclaim the establishment of the "Islamic Mobilization Youth Organization," and a committee was formed to run the organization, headed by the second defendant, Ya'qub, and with the third and fourth defendants, Ahmad and 'Abd-al-Hamid, as members, plus one Mahmud Tim. The second defendant, Ya'qub, paid committee members a monthly salary of approximately 160 Jordanian dinars. Amounts between 1,500-2,000 dinars were allocated for the committee's activities. The third and fourth defendants were assigned to recruit other members for the organization, both in Jordan or the occupied territory, using the slogan "Action to Liberate the Land." [passage omitted]

Government Embarks on Six-Year Economic Program

93AE0162C London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
27 Nov 92 p 10

[Article: "In Cooperation with IMF, Jordan Adopts Reform Program to Reduce Inflation From 80 to 4.5 Percent"]

[Text] Jordan is trying to save its economy by adopting a new economic rectification program for 1992-1998, in cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank. Jordan did this after real growth of the gross domestic product dropped by 2.3 percent in 1990, as a result of a drop in performance for most economic sectors, and the Gulf crisis. A study indicated that the program is aimed at reducing inflation from an average of 80 percent to 4.5 percent.

This program reflects Jordan's developed strategy for 1992-1998 to deal with economic and fiscal problems

accumulated as a result of the economic crisis in 1988, and the political-economic crisis resulting from the Gulf situation in 1990. The new rectification program is also aimed at increasing growth rates in the GDP from 3 percent in 1992 to 4.3 percent in 1998.

This study was done by the International Studies Center of the Royal Scientific Society, which is conducting research on the most important Jordanian economic issues, in accordance with the circumstances prevailing in Jordan, in order to propose appropriate policies.

The study states that the new rectification program is also aimed at reducing inflation rates from 80 percent in 1991 to 4.5 percent in 1998, reducing the budget deficit, decreasing non-production expenditures in the public and military sectors, and gradually increasing credit and local investment, along with developing investment capability. It is also aimed at encouraging the private sector to take a bigger role in investment and credit activities and in development goals, at implementing a wise financing policy to end the cash liquidity so as to be more in harmony with the level of inflation, and at restricting foreign and domestic borrowing for purposes of financing the deficit in the general budget and in the balance of payments.

'Democratic Labor Union Alliance' Formed

93AE0162A Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 17 Nov 92 p 8

[Article: "Formation of Democratic Labor Union Alliance"]

[Text] A group of union leaders have announced the formation of a labor bloc under the name of the Jordanian Democratic Labor Union Alliance.

In a communique announcing the establishment of the alliance, it was stated that "starting from a deeply-rooted belief that defending labor issues strengthens the defense of the nation and its social security, development and progress, we have resolved to establish a democratic, popular labor organization to take upon its shoulders—by democratic and legal means—the task of carrying the message of defending the rights of the working class and developing the performance of its union movement.

In this statement, which enumerated the goals and objectives of the alliance, it was noted that a part of the union movement, with its organizations and institutions, was striving to contribute to the modernization and development of the institutions of the General Federation of Labor Unions and its union organizations, in order to respond to the democratic changes in the country. This could revitalize the union movement and activate its role and democracy. Moreover, this alliance does not form an extension of the alliance established in March 1990, which has become virtually defunct.

AL-DUSTUR has learned that among the names of the founders are: Yusuf al-Hurani, from the banking union;

Sidqi al-Fuqaha' from the ports union; Muhammad Qasim of the banking union; Akram Abu- Zaynah, from the health services union; and Jamal Mustafa from the banking union.

KUWAIT

Officials Discuss GCC Economic Problems

Finance Ministers' Meeting

93AE0126A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 17 Nov 92 p 10

[Report from Kuwait by Ghanim al-Matiri: "GCC Finance Ministers Discuss Discrepancies Between Arab and Gulf Economic Agreements"]

[Text] The Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] finance ministers are to meet next Sunday at the GCC secretariat headquarters in Riyadh to discuss the more pivotal economic issues that will be submitted to the GCC summit scheduled for Abu Dhabi next December. An official Kuwaiti source told AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that GCC finance ministers would attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between the economic agreement among GCC member states and the economic agreement between them and other Arab countries. They are also scheduled to discuss the recommendations of the recent fourth meeting, monitor the progress of the team working on a uniform GCC customs tariff towards the outside world, review the minutes of the 16th meeting of GCC directors of customs held last 17-18 May, and scrutinize a GCC secretariat memorandum on real estate purchases in member states by citizens of other GCC members. The finance ministers are also to discuss one secretariat memorandum on continuing the control and regulation of retail merchants, and another on the implementation of a resolution by the finance ministers' Commission on Fiscal and Economic cooperation to submit to relevant ministerial committees the professions and activities [as published] of educational, health, information, and cultural services.

The source added that the finance ministers will also discuss [GCC] secretariat memoranda on the minutes of the 18th meeting of the governors of GCC central banks and monetary agencies, which was held in Abu Dhabi last September, on a GCC Supreme Council resolution to implement the Uniform Trade Agreement, and on mandating that national manufacturers imprint in Arabic a statement of origin on products manufactured in the GCC states.

Kuwait's delegation to the finance ministers meeting will be headed by Minister of Finance and Planning Nasir 'Abdallah al-Radwan.

Investment Director on Arab Capital

93AE0126B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
17 Nov 92 p 11

[Interview with Dr. Khalid al-Fayiz, Executive Director of Gulf Investment Agency, by Ghunaym Muhammad al-Matiri in Kuwait"]

[Text] The Gulf Investment Agency [GIA] has become one of the most outstanding agencies in the Gulf region, thanks to its accomplishments, investment practices, and services to those who wish to enter that field. The agency became operational in November 1983 and was the first financial institution to be founded under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]. It is equally owned by the six GCC member states.

The agency's stated objectives focus on supporting the economic development and integration efforts of the partner states, developing their financial resources, helping them diversify their sources of income, ensuring an appropriate return on their investment, and encouraging private sector participation in regional development by creating opportunities for direct investment in local industries.

When interviewed by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, Dr. Khalid al-Fayiz said that the GIA's purchase of International Gulf Bank shares was its first investment outside the industrial, farming, and fisheries sectors.

He added that the purchase of the bank has greatly enhanced the agency's operations and capabilities and is expected to complement its operations and help it achieve its future objectives.

He explained that because the agency's building in Kuwait was not severely damaged by the war, and that even though its activities were curtailed in 1991 after coming to a halt in Kuwait because of the occupation, it managed to realize a net income of \$80.3 million that year, greatly surpassing its \$1.8 million income in the year of the of the invasion.

Damage Control

He said that the "Agency differed from other enterprises hurt by the Iraqi invasion in that it was successful in damage control. Our International Gulf Bank operations never halted. On the morning of Black Thursday, 2 August 1990, we were able to promptly notify all our clients, in person or by fax, that we had transferred operations to Bahrain via the bank. With a staff of only 12, and with the use of Gulf International Bank facilities, we managed to fulfill our obligations and to secure our receivables. We maintained constant touch with our employees and continued to remit their salaries and wages to them in their native countries. We even helped some of our employees who remained in Kuwait. In general, the invasion did not have a direct negative impact on the agency and it did not accrue any losses in 1990—rather, it realized a slim profit margin that year."

Gulf International Bank

On the agency's purchase of Gulf International Bank, al-Fayiz said that the Bahrain-based bank is jointly owned by the six GCC states and is engaged in lending and deposit transactions throughout the Gulf and the world. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait affected the bank in two respects. Its liquidity suffered because foreign institutions refrained from dealing with [Gulf] establishments, including the bank. It was also a lender to a number of countries that suffered setbacks. The bank's finances were in the red by the end of 1990 and its founding countries lost their shares of capital.

"The agency, on the other hand, became sole owner of Gulf International Bank in an investment move for which \$450 million in new capital was made available. The agency is represented at the bank by a new board of directors that supports its role and enhances its operations. Last year's [financial] results were more than satisfactory.

Bank Expansion

[al-Mutayri] Will the bank have an opportunity to open branches in the GCC states?

[Dr. al-Fayiz] I wish the GCC states would allow us to open Gulf International Bank branches, but the bank is considered an offshore institution in Bahrain, and is therefore not allowed to open branches in the region. It is to be noted that the bank was founded for the purpose of engaging in foreign operations and that each country in the region has an adequate number of local banks. After 1987, the bank was allowed to operate in the region from Bahrain, and it does so from there. Of course, each country in the region has its own banking laws and regulations and they are all protective of their banking sectors. Discussions continue on allowing Gulf citizens to acquire shares in banks and insurance companies.

In Kuwait

Kuwaiti monetary and central bank policies would indicate a trend towards economic liberalization, but it is common knowledge that Kuwaiti banks and financial institutions have been suffering problems of so-called difficult debt ever since the al-Manakh crisis.

Kuwaiti bank positions must be ameliorated before foreign corporations will enter. The prevailing view calls for resolving domestic bank problems first, and then we will see whether there will be need for expansion. We are now in a holding period awaiting the results of the solutions that have been advanced.

Advisor to Kuwait

[al-Mutayri] What role does the agency play vis-a-vis the privatization of numerous Kuwaiti government enterprises?

[Dr. al-Fayiz] The GIA acts as an advisor to the State of Kuwait on privatization, the sale of various public sector

enterprises to the private sector, and giving the private sector an opportunity to take over the operation and management of those enterprises. We, as an agency, conduct relevant feasibility studies. When a decision is reached to privatize an enterprise, our role is to help define the methodology of bringing it to market. Should we recognize an investment opportunity, we would seize upon it and enter the market as buyers.

Kuwaiti Investments

[al-Mutayri] How do you comment on the issue of Kuwaiti investments abroad?

[Dr. al-Fayiz] Kuwaiti investment policies abroad differ from those of other countries of the region in that Kuwait has engaged in direct investments. Generally speaking, foreign investments are a good idea for a country with great means but few investment opportunities. As for the situation of Kuwaiti investments abroad and the issues currently surrounding them—this is a matter for the relevant authorities. It must be said, however, that problems must exist, otherwise the matter would not have been referred to the Prosecutor General's office.

There is no doubt that investing abroad is a good idea for a country whose means are great but whose domestic investment opportunities are limited, but this requires a system capable of monitoring those investments. Investment abroad involves risk.

Arab Investments

[al-Mutayri] What about Arab investments, both domestic and foreign?

[Dr. al-Fayiz] At any rate, foreign investments are not usually welcome in the host country—i.e. German investments in the United States. In general, most countries have reservations about foreign investment. Some of them close certain sectors, such as defense, to all foreign investors.

Dr. al-Fayiz believes that Arab investors in the West have hurt themselves by the manner in which they entered that sector, through misinformation and prior propaganda, especially since "patriotic sentiment is for investing in the Arab fatherland."

[Dr. al-Fayiz] I assure you that Gulf capital did not go to the West because it is fond of it, but because the climate in Western countries allows for safe and secure investment. There is lots of talk about investing in the Arab fatherland, but only in generalities. No serious projects or proposals are offered.

[al-Mutayri] Who is complaining?

[Dr. al-Fayiz] Strangely enough, the countries that complain about Arab investment suffer, but do live under, a crisis of domestic capital, since their citizens invest their funds abroad.

We could say, emotionally speaking, that charity begins at home, but certain Arab countries offer no investment opportunities while the investment climate in others is unhealthy.

We, as the Gulf Investment Agency, have studied more than 200 investment opportunities in the Gulf region since 1985 and have committed to only 13, which is a relatively high ratio as new ventures go.

Long-term industrial investment takes time to achieve the desired returns. It is difficult to bring an investment concept to life, especially if the private sector is involved. There is a saturation of traditional industries replacing imports, whereas viable industries would depend on the region's comparative advantage in oil, gas, and petroleum derivatives. When we decide to participate in such industries we find that each state wants to implement them alone, to the exclusion of others. Those industries are state monopolies.

Studies on Kuwaiti Privatization

Dr. al-Fayiz pointed out that the agency is currently analyzing a number of Kuwaiti enterprises proposed for privatization. The agency may purchase shares in these if they are offered to the private sector. He explained, however, that people will refrain from investing and that incentives will remain frozen until the debt problem is pragmatically resolved.

Cable TV

He emphasized that the agency will not be a laggard in sponsoring the cable TV project and that a study is currently being undertaken of the feasibility of implementing that project in only one or all of the GCC states. "We will not hesitate to build a station to televise entertainment programming if it promises to be viable for us and if we are allowed to do so."

He added that preliminary studies bode well and that "there is hope. We continue our studies in order to develop an integrated, successful project."

Staff Composition

Al-Fayiz observed that the staff composition of the agency indicates a higher ratio of Gulf personnel. The agency employs 120 workers, of whom 80 are Gulf nationals and 50 are Kuwaiti.

He pointed out that the agency last year allocated \$500,000 for staff education and training. He said: "The region is in need of a good training institution. We have already submitted a number of proposals to both private and public sectors for establishing a leadership institute."

Kuwait Ready To Be Financial Center

Dr. Khalid al-Fayiz emphasized that Kuwait is eminently qualified to be a capital market in the region. All the requirements for such a center theoretically exist and

are available, be they surplus capital or educated youths with investment experience.

He added: "There is no doubt that such a center would have to be rooted in the banking sector and that laws and facilities must exist to stimulate vigorous operation, free from administrative impediments and red tape. It would not be feasible to create a financial center embroiled in various complications."

Al-Fayiz concluded by emphasizing the importance of reaching a decision [on that issue] and of providing all the elements necessary to create a 'financial center' atmosphere in the region.

MOROCCO

Critical Situation in Textile Industry Examined

93AF0255A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 27 Nov 92 p 35

[Article by Karim Labbene: "Economic or Structural Crisis?"; first paragraph is LA VIE ECONOMIQUE introduction]

[Text] Textiles are one of Morocco's main strategic sectors. Geared for the most part towards exports, this sector is in crisis today. In this article Karim Labbene gives us the recommendations from a major study, the publication of which we conclude this week.

In eight articles, we have looked at the specific characteristics of the textile sector. Because it is essentially geared towards exports, this industry should be presented in its international context. The latter is characterized by ever fiercer competition, given the permanent arrival of new producers or new countries that have converted to market economies. But it would not be normal today to seek protection in a "parcellization" of the international market in order to explain the crisis facing Moroccan textiles. Is this an economic crisis or rather a structural one?

The answer is tied to a great extent to domestic factors that are unable to develop and go along with changes in the sector at the international level.

Towards an Integrated Industry

The first challenge that the Moroccan textile sector will have to face is the setting up of an integrated production chain.

Thus far the sector has been strongly tied to givers of orders, particularly foreigners. There has never been a true development strategy for the sector. The only existing "strategy" aimed at expanding exports, which pushed the expansion of activities down to the end of the chain without other activities following.

If mention should be made of the relative growth of investments in networks of cotton mills, these investments remain largely imbalanced. However a local

demand does exist even if it is somewhat dominated by foreign imports, under coercion by those giving orders. But it is imports of semimanufactured items, which have the greatest weight in our trade balance. These products, often imported as part of a temporary admission system by export companies, account for almost one-third of the sector's imports. It would be significant and urgent to produce and locally offer these products. That is something that will cut down on our imports and relieve the sector of the effects of direct dependence on those who give orders.

Almost everywhere we can see laborers working in the textile industry being given little technical supervision. Although the Moroccan textile industry is still an industry with a low level of technology but a high level of manpower, and thus an industry with a simple and not complex technology, it is marked by a low level of technical supervision. The reasons for this are many. We have already discussed them. But what we should remember today is that the specialized Moroccan system of training is quantitatively and qualitatively poor, given an industry that employs more than 160,000 people. On the other hand, it is surprising to see highly trained textile technicians with degrees from the Institutes of Applied Technologies (ITA) who have risen rapidly be unemployed. However we know several graduates with technical degrees, particularly in upkeep and maintenance or labor organization and methods, who are looking for jobs. Furthermore we should encourage and expand apprenticeship programs, even introduce a regulatory reform, thus cutting down the number of part-time jobs and limiting the involuntary mobility of sector employees. How many of them work in textile companies and leave without any qualifications? Apprenticeship presupposes minimizing people's mobility.

Innovative Structures

The technical supervision challenge can only be met as part of a policy of technical and technological innovation. Today technical innovation, i.e., of the production process, is the sector's main comparative and competitive advantage at the international level. Importing the latest technical novelties—machines run by computers or automated—cannot bring national production up to the international level. That comes from the ability to master this technology and keep the materiel in service as long as possible while emphasizing a high level of productivity, high quality, and the lowest costs. Now these production costs have been boosted by forced halts in production in the wake of breakdowns and unforeseen stoppages, and by waste, mainly of spare parts and raw or semimanufactured materials. Even if most Moroccan textile companies are small scale, their production is still very unstructured.

So product innovation and investing in the life cycle of these products become important. The technical side of things by itself is still insufficient. Because to it must be added know-how so it will become a technology. This

know-how is also essential to innovate our products if we want to hold on to our shares of markets if not acquire other markets.

The policy of subcontracting followed by a number of companies in the sector strongly limits the acquisition of this know-how. Because the companies are directly and continuously dependent on the patterns, models, colors, fashions, and styles of those who give them their orders. As a result, there are no local research offices and thus no production of knowledge and know-how. This is another priority, which is in the province of the mere wish and determination of Moroccan industrialists.

Mastering International Distribution Channels

Subcontracting also limits promotion of the Moroccan product. It is true that subcontracting ensures sales of national production. But since the product thus manufactured cannot be sold as is, since it makes up a subset of a set of products, actual national production remains just as limited by orders from those giving orders. Furthermore, even in the case of the production of finished products which are ready for purchase, the policy of subcontracting puts a brake on and even prevents Moroccan products from directly getting to or as close as possible to the consumer and thus the products' sale prices are higher.

But considering the limited financial means of Moroccan companies, which cannot see to the distribution of their products on their own, by opening up trade agencies abroad, in addition to these sales' being poorly organized, which sometimes results in competition between Moroccan businesses and disloyal and destructive competition abroad [as published]. Keeping all this in mind, Moroccan products do not sell well, which also calls for the establishment of a distribution strategy—and not simply one of promotion—for Moroccan products.

Trade Balance Figures Given for Jan-Jul

93AF0241A Rabat L'OPINION in French 2 Dec 92
pp 5-6

[Unattributed article: "Trade Balance at the End of July 1992: Imports Increase (+8.9 Percent), Exports Stable"]

[Text] At the end of July 1992, foreign commercial trade reached an overall total of 56,739.7 million dirhams as against 53,791.2 million dirhams for the same time period in 1991, or a 5.5-percent increase.

Imports climbed to 37,045.6 million dirhams as compared with 34,015.6 million dirhams one year ago, for an 8.9-percent increase, whereas exports remained stable from one year to the next: 19,694.1 million dirhams as compared with 19,775.6 million dirhams—that is -0.4 percent. The trade deficit, which reached 17,351.5 million dirhams as compared with -14,240 million dirhams in 1991, worsened by 21.9 percent; the food [trade deficit], -806.6 million dirhams, was greater than all of the increases reported for the other groups of products.

[I.] Imports

Up by 8.9 percent, imports made in the first seven months of 1992 came to a total of 37,045.6 million dirhams as compared with 34,015.6 million dirhams, for a 13.2-percent increase in volume (10,555.1 MT [metric tons] as compared with 9,321.5 MT).

Food, Beverages, and Tobacco

Supplies for and the rate at which exports covered imports recorded a drop of 4.9 points, ending up at 53.2 percent as compared with 58.1 percent.

With regard to imports, aside from semimanufactured products, which dropped by 210.3 million dirhams, agricultural hard goods, which also dropped by 91.3 million dirhams, and mining products, which held stable, all the other groups of products recorded increases, with industrial hard goods in particular: +1,582.4 million dirhams and food products: +1,155.9 million dirhams.

On the other hand, where imports were concerned, the drop with respect to food items grew by 36.9 percent in the period under review for a 27.4-percent increase in volume, bringing the total to 4,302.4 million dirhams for 2,141.5 MT as compared with 3,147.5 million dirhams for 1,681.5 MT.

Purchases of cereals, which account for 42.8 percent of the total for this category as compared with 35.9 percent in 1991, grew by 63 percent, reaching 1,840.2 million dirhams as compared with 1,128.8 million dirhams.

Wheat imports, which account for 78.3 percent of cereal products, recorded a 68.3-percent increase in value as compared with just 16.7 percent by volume. These imports came to 1,441 million dirhams for 1,276.6 MT as compared with 856.3 million dirhams for 1,093.7 MT.

This trend came about from the 44.2-percent increase in the average price per metric ton, which went from 783 dirhams in 1991 to 1,129 dirhams this year.

With regard to other food products, the increase was just as great in the case of sugar: +182.3 million dirhams (511.2 million dirhams as compared with 328.9 million dirhams) and milk products: +161 million dirhams (501.1 million dirhams as compared with 340.1 million dirhams).

Energy and Lubricants

Energy products' share of overall imports went from 14.2 percent to 13.7 percent. Although the imported volume grew 10.1 percent (4,691.5 MT as compared with 4,195 MT), the energy bill grew 5.4 percent in value only: 5,092.8 million dirhams as compared with 4,830.4 million dirhams.

This situation arose from a 4.3-percent drop in the average price per metric ton (1,102 dirhams as compared with 1,151 dirhams).

Crude petroleum oil, which accounts for 85.3 percent of the total for this category, with a value of 4,346.3 million dirhams, as compared with 3,814.3 million dirhams in 1991, or +13.9 percent, recorded a 25.7-percent increase in terms of quantities purchased (3,700.1 MT as compared with 2,944.3 MT).

Among other products, the drop in imports of unrefined coal (-128 million dirhams), gasoil (-90.7 million dirhams), and paraffin (-49.4 million dirhams) may be noted.

Nonmanufactured Products of Animal and Vegetable Origin

Purchases of nonmanufactured products of animal and vegetable origin increased 12-percent in value (2,532 [million] dirhams as compared with 2,260.1 million dirhams) for a 29-percent increase in volume (706.4 MT as compared with 547.4 MT).

This increase is essentially attributable to undressed wood, which accounts for 37 percent in this category, with a 16-percent increase figure (936.5 million dirhams as compared with 807.3 million dirhams) as well as for grains and oily fruits: +80.8 million dirhams, and vegetable oils, +64.8 million dirhams.

However the drop affected purchases of cotton: -55 million dirhams (354.5 million dirhams as compared with 409.5 million dirhams); and of pulp: -37.6 million dirhams (59.7 million dirhams as compared with 97.3 million dirhams).

Unfinished Products of Mineral Origin

Purchases of mineral products stabilized despite a 30.1-percent increase in volume. The value of these purchases was 1,498.1 million dirhams for 1,336.1 MT as compared with 1,507.1 million dirhams for 1,026.9 MT, that is, -0.6 percent.

Sulphur, which alone accounts for 61.7 percent of this category, dropped 2.4 percent for a total of 924.4 million dirhams as compared with 946.9 million dirhams, this despite a 31.1-percent increase in purchased volume (1,197.5 million dirhams as compared with 913.4 million dirhams). This trend resulted in a 25.6-percent drop in the average price per metric ton, which went from 1,037 to 772 dirhams.

Semimanufactured Products

Overall imports of semimanufactured products recorded a slight drop of 2.3 percent: 8,745.7 million dirhams as compared with 8,956 million dirhams. This drop is the result of varying trends for different products in this group. So the drop mainly affected chemical products: -141.8 million dirhams (1,302.5 million dirhams as compared with 1,444.3 million dirhams), natural and chemical fertilizers: -126.8 million dirhams (177 million dirhams as compared with 303.8 million dirhams); and piping and tubing accessories: -114.4 million dirhams (75.3 million dirhams as compared with 189.7 million dirhams).

However the increase with regard to artificial plastic materials was a major one: +104.2 million dirhams (896 million dirhams as compared with 791.8 million dirhams), and paper and cardboard: +105.5 million dirhams (667.9 million dirhams as compared with 562.4 million dirhams).

Hard Goods

Hard goods, accounting for 28.5 percent of total imports, as compared with 26.6 percent in 1991, recorded a 16.5-percent increase, thus remaining the top import product group: 10,545.2 million dirhams as compared with 9,054.1 million dirhams. This increase is attributable to industrial hard goods: +18.2 percent; indeed, agricultural hard goods dropped 26.2 percent.

Agricultural Hard Goods

With a total of 257.5 million dirhams as compared with 348.8 million dirhams one year ago, hard goods purchases dropped 91.3 million dirhams. This drop affected all products in this category, particularly agricultural tractors: -79.7 million dirhams (94.1 as compared with 173.8 million dirhams) and agricultural machines and tools: -11.5 million dirhams (162.9 million dirhams as compared with 174.4 million dirhams).

Industrial Hard Goods

Accounting for 27.8 percent of all foreign purchases, industrial hard goods this year recorded an 18.2-percent increase, reaching 10,287.5 million dirhams as compared with 8,705.3 million dirhams. By volume, the increase was just 4.6 percent, rising from 116.4 MT to 121.7 MT.

The increase, which affected a large number of products, was greatest for aircraft: +552.1 million dirhams (553.5 million dirhams as compared with 1.4 million dirhams); pulverizing materiel: +545.3 million dirhams (955.9 million dirhams as compared with 410.6 million dirhams), various machines and equipment: +215.5 million dirhams (1,676.8 million dirhams as compared with 1,461.3 million dirhams), and rolling railroad materiel: +183 million dirhams (326.2 million dirhams as compared with 143.2 million dirhams).

As regards the drop, it affected mainly sea vessels: 504.2 million dirhams (134.4 million dirhams as compared with 638.6 million dirhams); electrical equipment for telephony: -77.7 million dirhams (514.1 million dirhams as compared with 591.8 million dirhams); and electrical circuit-breaking equipment: -56.9 million dirhams (184.5 million dirhams as compared with 241.4 million dirhams).

Consumer Goods

Despite the slight drop in their share of total imports: -0.8 percent (11.7 percent as compared with 12.5 percent), purchases of manufactured consumer products amounted to 4,329.4 million dirhams as compared with 4,260.5 million dirhams, or a 1.6-percent increase.

The quantities imported also increased 1.6 percent (75.3 MT as compared with 74.1 MT).

Among the products that recorded an increase, the following should be mentioned: medicine: +55.9 million dirhams (415.2 million dirhams as compared with 359.3 million dirhams); items made of plastic: +44.5 million dirhams (261.5 million dirhams as compared with 217 million dirhams); refrigerators: +29.8 million dirhams (65.9 million dirhams as compared with 36.1 million dirhams); and separate pieces for touring cars: +22.3 million dirhams (213.8 million dirhams as compared with 191.5 million dirhams).

However major declines were reported in the area of touring cars: -91 million dirhams (523.2 million dirhams as compared with 614.2 million dirhams); radio and television sets: -52.8 million dirhams (83.3 million dirhams as compared with 136.1 million dirhams); and cotton fabrics: -43.7 million dirhams (435.6 million dirhams as compared with 479.3 million dirhams).

II.Exports

By the end of July 1992, exports deemed free on board [F.O.B.] stabilized at 19,694.1 million dirhams as compared with 19,775.6 million dirhams in 1991. This stability, which occurred despite increases recorded for most of the groups of products (hard goods: +12 percent; nonmanufactured products of animal and vegetable origin: +10.2 percent; semimanufactured products: +6.9 percent; consumer products: +4.2 percent; and mining products: +1.3 percent), results from the net decline in exports of food products: -14 percent or -806.6 million dirhams, and, to a lesser extent, of energy products: -1.2 percent or -6.4 million dirhams.

Semimanufactured Products Other Than Phosphate Derivatives

Exports of semimanufactured products other than phosphate derivatives recorded a slight 2.1-percent increase or +27.9 million dirhams, coming out at 1,355 million dirhams as compared with 1,327.1 million dirhams.

This figure is the result of steady sales of cotton yarn: 220.4 million dirhams as compared with 140.2 million dirhams, or +57.2 percent or +80.2 million dirhams; [also] volatile oils and essences: 82.1 million dirhams as compared with 66.4 million dirhams or +23.6 percent or +15.7 million dirhams; wood: 74 million dirhams as compared with 42.3 million dirhams or +74.9 percent or +31.7 million dirhams; and leather and skins: 45.5 million dirhams as compared with 40 million dirhams or +13.8 percent or +5.5 million dirhams. However unrefined silver dropped 66.3 percent: 35.4 million dirhams

as compared with 105.1 million dirhams or -69.7 million dirhams; and unrefined lead 28.4 percent: 120.4 million dirhams as compared with 168.1 million dirhams, or -47.4 million dirhams.

Hard Goods

Foreign sales of hard goods increased 12 percent or +96.5 million dirhams, reaching 901.1 million dirhams as compared with 804.6 million dirhams in 1991.

This improvement was achieved thanks to the increase in crystal diodes: 401.5 million dirhams as compared with 318.4 million dirhams or +26.1 percent or +83.1 million dirhams; and composite transistors: 255.5 million dirhams as compared with 245.1 million dirhams or +4.2 percent or +10.4 million dirhams. These two products account for 72.9 percent of the overall value of this group.

Consumer Goods

By the end of July 1992, exports of consumer goods reached 5,761.9 million dirhams as compared with 5,530 million dirhams or a 4.2-percent increase or 231.8 million dirhams.

Because of this, this group of products is in the top rank of exports, with 29.3 percent of the total.

Regarding individual products, varying trends were noted:

- an increase in sales of manufactured clothing, 2,690 million dirhams as compared with 2,471.8 million dirhams; items of hosiery, 1,422.7 million dirhams as compared with 1,246.3 million dirhams or +14.2 percent or +176.4 million dirhams; and blankets, 88.9 million dirhams as compared with 48.8 million dirhams or +82.2 percent or +40.1 million dirhams;
- a drop in sales of shoes: 358.3 million dirhams as compared with 447 million dirhams or -19.8 percent or -88.7 million dirhams; cotton cloth: 26.3 million dirhams as compared with 72.4 million dirhams or -63.7 percent or -46.1 million dirhams; and carpets: 199.8 million dirhams as compared with 219.5 million dirhams or -8.9 percent or -19.7 million dirhams.

Exports of Phosphates and Derivatives

During the first seven months of 1992, the turnover in exports achieved by the Moroccan Phosphates Office [OCP] group improved 5.4 percent or 245.9 million dirhams, reaching 4,795.4 million dirhams compared with 4,549.5 million dirhams for a volume that was also 9.2 percent higher, or 7,039 MT as compared with 6,447 MT.

This turnover accounts for 24.3 percent of all exports.

The trend for the different products sold by the group is as follows:

- an 11.7-percent increase or 140.7 million dirhams for

natural and chemical fertilizers: 1,344.6 million dirhams as compared with 1,203.9 million dirhams for 950 MT as compared with 767.7 MT or +23.7 percent;

- a 7.9 percent drop or 138.3 million dirhams for phosphoric acid: 2,067.8 million dirhams as compared with 1,929.5 million dirhams for a 22.8-percent increase in volume (708.2 MT as compared with 576.8 MT);
- a 2.3-percent drop in rock phosphates or 33.1 million dirhams: 1,383 million dirhams as compared with 1,416.1 million dirhams despite the 5.5-percent rise in shipped volume: 5,380.8 MT as compared with 5,102.5 MT.

Exports Not Including Phosphates and Derivatives

Exports not including phosphates and derivatives recorded a 2.2-percent increase: 14,898.7 million dirhams as compared with 15,226.1 million dirhams or -327.4 million dirhams. So they account for 75.7 percent of the overall value of exports.

Food Products

Exports of food products totaled 4,935.3 million dirhams as compared with 5,741.9 million dirhams, i.e., a 14-percent drop or 806.6 million dirhams for a volume that also dropped 24.2 percent (708.5 MT as compared with 934.9 MT). This drop affected most of the products in the group and mainly: fresh fish: 490.4 million dirhams as compared with 702.3 million dirhams or -30.2 [percent] or -211.9 million dirhams for a volume that also dropped 44.8 percent (17.1 MT as compared with 31 MT); plums, 808.5 million dirhams as compared with 1,222.5 million dirhams or -33.9 percent or -414 million dirhams for a volume that also dropped 35.4 percent (309.7 MT as compared with 479.2 MT); canned vegetables: 473.1 million dirhams as compared with 539.3 million dirhams or -12.3 percent or -66.2 million dirhams (40 MT as compared with 45.6 MT or -12.3 percent); and fruit and vegetable juices: 70.8 million dirhams as compared with 183 million dirhams or -61.3 percent or -112.2 million dirhams.

Energy Products

Foreign sales of energy products recorded a 1.2-percent drop or -6.4 million dirhams: 544.3 million dirhams as compared with 550.7 million dirhams.

This decline showed up despite a 21.8-percent increase in volume: 336.7 MT as compared with 276.5 MT. However it needs to be pointed out that exports of the main component of this group, as it happens, refined petroleum products, recorded a 4-percent increase or 20.9 million dirhams (541.2 million dirhams as compared with 520.3 million dirhams).

Nonmanufactured Products of Animal and Vegetable Origin

By the end of the period under review, shipments of nonmanufactured products of animal and vegetable origin increased 10.2 percent or +70.3 million dirhams, reaching 761.9 million dirhams as compared with 691.6 million dirhams.

This improvement is attributable to good sales of pulp: 224.9 million dirhams as compared with 187.2 million dirhams or +20.1 percent or +37.7 million dirhams; plants and plant parts: 82.8 million dirhams as compared with 65.5 million dirhams or +26.4 percent or +17.3 million dirhams; and flowers and flower buds: 76.3 million dirhams as compared with 68.9 million dirhams or +10.7 percent or 7.4 million dirhams.

Nonmanufactured Products of Mineral Origin

Exports of mining products with the exception of phosphates recorded a 10.2-percent increase or +59 million dirhams: 639.1 million dirhams as compared with 580.1 million dirhams in 1991.

With regard to the different products in this category, varying trends were identifiable:

- an increase in sales of copper ore: 168.7 million dirhams as compared with 115.6 million dirhams or +45.9 percent or +53.1 million dirhams; copper chips and shavings: 99.1 million dirhams as compared with 59.9 million dirhams or +65.4 percent or +39.2 million dirhams;
- a drop in sales of barium sulfate: 80.7 million dirhams as compared with 91.3 or -11.6 percent or -10.6 million dirhams; of zinc ore: 38.3 million dirhams as compared with 45.9 million dirhams or -16.6 percent or -7.6 million dirhams; and fluorine: 52.6 million dirhams as compared with 59 million dirhams or -10.8 percent or -6.4 million dirhams.

Progression of Foreign Investments Discussed

93AF0238A Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 20 Nov 92 p 18

[Text] In 1991 foreign private investment in Morocco amounted to 3,270 million dirhams, or the equivalent of \$390 million, according to statistics from the Office of Foreign Exchange. Compared to 1982, the increase is quite impressive, because in 1982 foreign investment only amounted to 838 million dirhams (or \$134 million). However, this leap forward is relatively recent. During most of the decade of the 1980's, foreign investments stagnated at a level close to \$100 million annually, varying between 2 and 3 percent of Moroccan domestic investment (in terms of "gross formation of fixed capital"). In fact the sharp increase in foreign investment in Morocco began in 1989. It was consolidated in 1990 before beginning a new period of growth in 1991. The figures available for 1992 give us reason to conclude that this growth is continuing and even accelerating.

How should we interpret this growth? Is it making up for lost ground in the past or is it the decisive signal that Morocco has won the "investment battle"?

In terms of foreign investment, the country is in direct competition with the other countries of the Mediterranean littoral, not to mention the countries

of Southeast Asia or those of the former socialist camp. And a comparison still brings out a relatively low foreign investment level in Morocco.

As reflected in statistics of the International Monetary Fund, the following figures (in millions of dollars) speak for themselves:

Country	1988	1989	1990
Greece	\$908	\$752	\$1,005
Portugal	\$875	\$1,653	\$1,984
Turkey	\$354	\$663	\$713
Cyprus	\$62	\$70	\$130
Tunisia	\$60	\$74	\$90
Morocco	\$84	\$167	\$165
Egypt*	\$1,190		

* Figures for 1989 and 1990 not available.

These statistics bring out at least two phenomena:

1) On the one hand there was a general growth of foreign investment in all of the countries of the Mediterranean littoral;

2) On the other hand on a per capita basis Morocco did much less well than Tunisia, which has one-third as many people as Morocco but which attracted the equivalent of more than half of the foreign investment placed in Morocco. Cyprus (which has less than one million people) outdid Morocco, which also did not turn in as good a performance as Egypt. Morocco cannot be compared with the countries of Southern Europe, whether or not they are members of the European Community and whether they are Muslim, Orthodox, or Catholic (such as Turkey, Greece, and Portugal). These countries have inflation rates much higher than those of Morocco.

Who Invests in Morocco?

French investment accounts for one-fourth of foreign investment in Morocco, one-third comes from other countries of the European Community, and the balance can be attributed to Arab capital. There was very little American investment, although there was an increase in such investment toward the end of the period referred to. There was no Japanese investment and none from Southeast Asian countries.

Private investment in Morocco remains, so to speak, a "family affair." However, this European-Arab family does not so much involve the countries of the Maghreb, since investments from these countries are almost non-existent, apart from the appearance of Libyan capital in 1991. The establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union no doubt favored the movement of persons and goods. Capital did not follow this movement.

Variations in the composition of foreign investments over time and by country of origin confirm the ground lost which is referred to above.

The participation of Arab countries in capital investment in Morocco was relatively very substantial from 1982 to 1987, since it accounted for more than 45 percent of total foreign investment. The countries of origin of this Arab capital investment included, first of all, Saudi Arabia (one-third of the Arab investments in 1982), followed by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

Feminist Discusses Democracy, Fundamentalism

93AF0198A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 26 Oct 92 p 14

[Interview with sociologist Fatima Mernisi by Abdel-samed Ben Sharif in Rabat; date not given: "Social Research in Morocco Developing, Fundamentalism Not Only Danger to Women"—first two paragraphs are AL-HAYAH introduction]

[Text] Fatima Mernisi is a distinguished figure in the field of sociological writing, which she has made a tool to examine many of the issues with which social reality teems in its cultural, political, and temporal dimensions. She has also used her writing as a bridge that she has crossed pregnant in her questions, to continue the expression. By her effort as a researcher she has gained an important position in the discussion of the issue of women, which she has placed at the center of her concern.

Here is the text of the interview with her.

[Ben Sharif] What is the state of sociological research in Morocco now?

[Mernisi] First of all, I want to draw attention to an essential point in my intellectual career. I avoided doing

scientific field work for approximately five years for several very simple reasons, including the fact that absolutely no scientific researcher during the eighties could go out into a work or research area without asking permission from the Interior Ministry. We must realize also that scientific field research is a question of funding. Realistically, this was the greatest obstacle facing researchers interested in social, political, and economic changes. Then there was the view prevalent during the eighties regarding sociological research and the method of educating and training students in this field. The method consisted of cramming the recipient with written information that the professor would transmit, expecting it to be reproduced during examinations. Right from the beginning I absolutely did not believe in this idea. As a researcher in the American University I saw that there was no substitute for turning the wheel of field research. So I took the initiative and joined the Institute for Scientific Research. This change had concrete effects that basically found expression in the books I wrote. I devoted part of them to examining certain peripheral areas that remained in the shadow zone in our traditional culture. I concentrated on the Arab Islamic memory, which has become in our time the main area for all political maneuvers both for the right and for the left, with the result that this past is the only source from which the Arab individual can draw his identity. Because the religious and historical heritage that I had studied was presented to me in a truncated, primitive way that obliterated some aspects and emphasized others, I embarked on a process of reading history by a different method and with a scientific background. That was the context in which I wrote "Al-Harim al-Siyasi" [The Political Harem] and "Al-Sultanat al-Mansiyat" [Forgotten Women Sultans]. Now, after the hiatus I mentioned, I have returned to the field of scientific research, because the Berlin Wall has fallen, and this event has made me understand that the Arab walls in turn no longer are standing. Our citizens possess a large amount of intelligence and perception, especially young people, whom I consider the vanguard force that will pave the road to the coming century. I think there is no obstacle except the pyramidal nature of our inherited culture.

[Ben Sharif] The question of democracy has become a universal phenomenon. No country remains untouched by its winds.

[Mernisi] Democracy is equality and enabling the individual to participate and contribute to directing the affairs of his life. Democracy is one of the distinguishing features of this age. Our environment with all its components can absorb and entrench democratic values so as to serve the future and convince people that democracy is the passport to the shore of progress and prosperity. In this regard, I want to state that I turned to scientific research after I realized that Morocco had made great strides on the road to democratizing politics. This has been reflected on the level of public relations. Based on these new developments, we organized scientific research workshops, because we realized that workshops

can in a short time impart a series of field research techniques to the student, who then will use them in working on many subjects. In addition, the prevailing climate in our colleges has endowed them with an air of seriousness on various levels.

One should point out in this regard that a group of students have completed scientific research that has yielded respectable results. They carried out an opinion survey of 2,000 citizens on the question of marriage without encountering harassment from any quarter, and no one asked them for a license to complete the project. This was a notable accomplishment on their part.

[Ben Sharif] But does this mean that antidemocratic practices have vanished, never to return?

[Mernisi] In fact, there still are many phenomena like the practices you are referring to, but we must not forget that we are passing through a transition period. And there are objective roadblocks. Journalists, like sociologists, need legal protection in order to carry out their role. If we want to be precise, I should say that we are in the midst of a continuing period of pulse-taking. It is as if we were in a laboratory, testing the extent to which conditions and circumstances will allow us to progress or remain at a fixed point without movement or transition. The main factor that must be taken into consideration is that the current period imposes an inevitable necessity. If it proves to be otherwise, the destiny of the Arab peoples will be like that of the American Indians, who were condemned to perish, become isolated and marginalized, and sink into superstitions and myths.

[Ben Sharif] What does the Islamic memory mean to you?

[Mernisi] For me, the Islamic memory is a basic cornerstone, because you cannot form an idea of the future if you have no idea of the past. Dedicated exploration of the Islamic heritage is a vital operation for regaining identity and liberating a number of areas that were neglected for political reasons and motives. Thus, the history of popular movements has remained at a low level, because these movements took positions opposing and rejecting humiliation. The books I have completed in recent years fall into this framework.

[Ben Sharif] At the present time, all observers sense a resurgence of fundamentalist movements in both the eastern and western parts of the Arab world. One also notes a strong return to the past in search of a political and social alternative. Is there anything to justify this phenomenon?

[Mernisi] Objectively, the fundamentalist movements are the legitimate offspring of Arab political structures characterized by marginalizing the citizen and preventing his joining as a participating element in shaping political decisions. This marginalization crystallized through the destruction and abortion of progressive

thought and the scattering of its elements. Why, for example, do minds flee to the West, shine there, and produce intellectually and scientifically in a way that excites wonder, admiration, and appreciation? The explanation for this point goes back primarily to the behavior of neglect and not nurturing, so that those who remain in their country become liable to despair, confusion, and contradictions. Because progressive thought is what helps build an identity whose essential pole is the future, it has been fought by political structures that have naturally and spontaneously produced political oppositions that have found their strongest refuge in the past.

Furthermore, I think the fundamentalist movements are an indispensable necessity at this stage, because they have enabled millions of ordinary people to enter the political battlefield after having lived on its margin and at a distance from it. If these movements include a large number of women, that is something positive.

[Ben Sharif] Don't you think that any coming to power by these movements will raise questions for the women's movement and its activity?

[Mernisi] I think that if the fundamentalist movements are able to take the reins and get their hands on the decisionmaking mechanism, this will mean a qualitative development, provided that it is joined with the rise of a political system that protects human rights. For example, the FLN, which until recently was the only Algerian political party, bears responsibility for the state that women's conditions have reached. It was the FLN that brought the family law into existence—a law that completely destroys and attacks women's rights. So to those who talk about the fundamentalist movement as a danger to women's rights I say, When did these women ever have rights? Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia gave women positive and valuable things, but the basic questions did not find adequate conditions to see daylight and become concrete realities. The rights exist as written text, but in actuality they are absent.

Parties on Opposition Participation in Elections

93AF0198B London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
30 Nov 92 p 2

[Article: "Moroccan Parties Sketch Features of Parliament, Opposition Participation in Elections Expected"]

[Text] Rabat—Abderrahman Yousfi, general secretary of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP, opposition), has called on members of his party to prepare for next April's legislative elections by correcting the election rolls and resisting all forms of falsification.

Yousfi's comments came in the course of his speech to commune Unionist voters who met in a study day organized by the USFP to learn about mechanisms for running municipal and rural councils.

In what was considered to be agreement on the date set for holding parliamentary elections, the USFP has called

on the Moroccan government to take preparatory steps. In the party's view, these should take the form of cleaning up the election rolls, reforming the way in which voting supervising offices are formed, and expanding the powers of provincial committees charged with monitoring elections.

The newspaper AL-ALAM, which speaks for the Istiqlal Party, has expressed similar demands. It explained that the imminence of the next century requires a parliament different from previous parliaments. The government therefore must make an effort to guarantee the fairness of the elections. Political bodies must nominate able people—people who are "educated, enlightened, and of use whenever the assembly studies an economic, social, or political subject; people who are honest and honorable, who do not use parliament as a means to serve their interests."

In the same context, (Muhannad Lansar), general secretary of the Popular Movement (MP), said that commune elections took place in an atmosphere characterized by limpid honesty and neutrality of the administration, despite a few minor violations that were an exception.

(Al-'Unsur), who was talking to commune counselors from the MP party, condemned election fraud arising from voters and candidates who have engaged in buying consciences and spending enormous sums."

The remaining Moroccan parties are said either indirectly or explicitly to have expressed their readiness to enter the coming elections.

In this regard, participation by the Organization of Popular Democratic Action (OADP), which boycotted the municipal elections, is expected. The party newspaper ANWAL, it has been noticed, has continued to give information about how to register on the professional voting rolls.

SAUDI ARABIA

Desert Shield Armor Project Inaugurated

93AE0120A Jeddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 11 Nov 92
pp 1, 3

[Article: "Prince Sultan Patronizes Start of Desert Shield Armor Project Today"]

[Text] Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general, will visit the General War Industries Organization in al-Kharj on 11 November 1992 in order to ascertain the progress of work, look into workers' conditions, and to reassure himself about the situation.

Prince Sultan will lay the cornerstone for a factory of the Saudi Uniforms and Military Equipment Company,

which is one of the projects of industrial cooperation between the General War Industries Organization and the private sector.

His highness will also use this occasion to inaugurate the Desert Shield armor production project, which serves as a starting point for his desire to increase our armed forces' capability and the development and growth of military industries.

Furthermore, Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz will lay cornerstones for a number of Saudi armed forces' projects in the al-Kharj area.

The director general of the General War Industries Organization, Lieutenant General (Engineer) Muhammad Bin-Fahd al-Faysal, explained in a statement to the Saudi news agency that Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz would lay the cornerstone for a factory of the Saudi Uniforms and Military Equipment Company, which is a project of industrial cooperation between the General War Industries Organization and the private sector.

The director general pointed out that Prince Sultan will use this occasion to inaugurate the Desert Shield armor production project because of his desire to build up our armed forces' capability and the development and growth of war industries by means of integration with the private sector.

Al-Faysal said: "On this auspicious occasion and on behalf of my colleagues in the General War Industries Organization, we offer our thanks and gratitude to his royal highness, the second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general, for the honor of his visit to this organization. We thank God for such field visits as these to ascertain workers' conditions, follow up on the progress of work in the organization's plants, and view their industrial accomplishments.

"Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz will find in these workplaces support and respect for the organization and its workers, which causes all of us to be proud. This is proof of his highness' desire to support and encourage the organization and its employees to grow and develop, so that it can be a national industrial base, capable of serving our armed forces and fulfilling their requirements and needs."

The director general of the General War Industries Organization called on God to protect this country and its leaders, whose progress is watched over by the custodian of the two holy mosques, his highness the crown prince, and his highness the second deputy prime minister, minister of defense and aviation, and inspector general.

Prince Sultan Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz will also lay cornerstones for a number of projects concerned with the Saudi armed forces in the al-Kharj area.

SUDAN

Opposition Confirms Existence of Training Camps

93AF0249B Algiers EL-WATAN in French
25 Nov 92 p 11

[Unattributed article: "Training Camps in Sudan; The Opposition Confirms"—first paragraph is EL-WATAN introduction]

[Text] Sudanese opposition in Cairo disclosed that the Sudanese Government had turned the eastern Port Sudan/Suakin region into an Iranian military base where thousands of Iranian troops are concentrated.

According to the APS in Cairo, the opposition also indicated that Iran had set up a radio station in Port Sudan to broadcast Iranian propaganda toward Egypt and Arab countries.

According to the Egyptian opposition newspaper EL WAFD, Sudanese opposition further indicated that Sudanese-Iranian meetings had taken place in the last few days to discuss Sudan's granting facilities in Sudanese ports on the Red Sea in exchange for Iranian oil and military assistance. Under the agreement, Iran would lease the port of Port Sudan for 25 years.

The former Sudanese foreign minister and general secretary of the Union of Arab Lawyers also stated that Iran supports the Sudanese Government with weapons, oil, and money; he added that the Iranian-Sudanese military agreement signed last year by El Bachir and Rafsandjani is being implemented rapidly. He stated that the Sudanese opposition had given Arab governments whose citizens are being trained in Sudanese camps documents disclosing the camps names and locations, and he pointed out that these governments ignored the opposition's information, which they consider to be untrue.

The Iranians Persist

Mr. Abou Aissa also indicated that the veracity of this information has now been established; he stated that the camps are training men from Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Uganda, and Kenya, whose numbers keep increasing. Training, he said, is supervised by members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and takes place in several regions, namely: the "Arous" camp, south of the town of Shendi; the Shambat camp, north of the Sudanese capital; the Jebel Aulia camp, south of Khartoum; and the "El Katma" camp, 100 km south of the Sudanese capital. At its last Saturday meeting, the Iranian National Security Supreme Council chaired by Rafsanjani decided to intensify its efforts to export fundamentalism to Algeria and Egypt, a communique from the Iranian People's Mojahedins, the Iranian resistance movement headed by Messaoud Radjabi, reported.

A report prepared by the special "Qods" force of the Pasdarans was presented at the meeting, assessing the

progress of the government's plans in these two countries, the communique further indicated; according to the communique, the conclusion of the report was that the chances of success in developing and promoting fundamentalism are greater in Egypt and Algeria than in other Arab countries. The report also included a new plan to expand the Mollahs' designs on these countries, which was approved by the National Security Supreme Council.

At the meeting, Iranian Government officials decided to intensify their efforts to establish governments like theirs in these countries, as this is the only way for them to break their international isolation. They are also concerned about ensuring the survival of their government in Iran, where they are faced with many crises and an increasing number of demonstrations by the people.

BANGLADESH

Bengali Paper Condemns Indian Mosque Demolition

*BK2112141392 Dhaka DAINIK ITTEFAQ in Bengali
8 Dec 92 p 2*

[Editorial: "We Are Hurt, Concerned"]

[Text] The Babri Mosque has been demolished. It has been learned that a majority of the police force deployed at the site left before the demolition work started. A BBC commentary said that was a special signal for the radical Hindus who had assembled there. One hundred and three companies of reserve police belonging to the central government were deployed about a half mile away from the place of the incident, but they refused to take any action as they did not have any formal orders. The Bharatiya Janata Party [BJP] government of Uttar Pradesh had assured the Supreme Court and the central government that the law and order situation would not be disturbed. According to the Supreme Court of India, this is the first incident of a breach of commitment given to the court in independent India. Two judges of the court are of the opinion that this demolition of the Babri Mosque was not a sudden accident. They say it was done in a premeditated manner.

Many non-Muslim organizations of India, including former Prime Minister V.P. Singh, had appealed to impose a ban on the World Hindu Council but no one paid any heed to them. When V.P. Singh, along with his group, made a long march toward Ayodhya, he was detained on the way; but the hundreds of thousands of militants were given free access to Ayodhya. Indian Prime Minister Narashima Rao described this incident as a disgrace for India and dismissed the Uttar Pradesh Government. The prime minister could have taken this action earlier. Had it been done, the outcome of the incident, perhaps, would not have been so hellish. There was a serious debate on this issue in the Cabinet. It has been learned from different sources that several ministers, including Arjun Singh, were in favor of dismissing the Uttar Pradesh Government. Imam Bukhari has blamed the prime minister and the home minister for the incident. West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu supported him and gave a call for a strike.

The Bharatiya Janata Party and the World Hindu Council claim that the Babri Mosque was built on the birthplace of Hindu god Rama. But there is no evidence to prove this claim. The Archaeological Department of India has said there is no evidence to confirm that the mosque was built after demolishing the temple. Eminent Hindu historians, including Jadunath Sarkar, have never said any such thing.

It was not difficult for our government to visualize what the reaction both within and outside the country would be to the demolition of the Babri Mosque. A question has arisen in the minds of many people as to why the

government did not take necessary precautionary measures, including deployment of the Bangladesh Rifles, when news of the demolition reached them. Earlier, the religious-minded people of Bangladesh faced such communal provocations rationally, and with patience and restraint. It is expected that this time also they will maintain this tradition. We are definitely hurt by the activities of a section of the Indian people. But it should be remembered that respected leader Mahatma Gandhi was killed by this very group of people. We condemn this barbarous incident. At the same time, we appeal to our neighboring country to take measures to protect the life and property of the minority community and to maintain peace and communal harmony.

IRAN

Switch to Kiwi Production Proves Disastrous

*93AS0316H London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Dec 92
p 4*

[Text] Kiwi, a fruit that up to some time ago was unknown in Iran, today has caused a rather important group of the people of Gilan and Mazandaran to be confronted with the treat of a significant decrease in income. This fruit, because of its high-quality variety last year, sold at 4,000-5,000 rials per kg, has now dropped to 1,500-200 rials per kg in the retail market.

Tehran newspapers write that the drop stems from the uncontrolled cultivation and significant increase in the supply of this product. In northern Iran, part of the lands with potential for rice farming, tea planting, fruit orchards, and even pastures, have been assigned to plant kiwi. In other words, the rice farmers, tree farmers, and those who dwell on the margins of the forests hoping to gain more income, have abandoned their traditional activities and started to plant this "luxury fruit." A group of tea farmers, and even nonnative people, have bought tea farms, destroyed the plants that usually come to production in five to seven years, and planted kiwi instead.

As a result, this year, with the invasion of kiwi on the consumer markets, a number of producers have even faced rotting products. Nevertheless, the kiwi producers say that even if the price of this product drops to 200 rials per kg, it is still more feasible than tea, rice, and other produce.

ECO Begins New Chapter With New Members

93AS0316G London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Dec 92 p 4

[Text] The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), admitting seven new members, has started a new chapter in its life. In a meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, which was held on Saturday, 28 November, in Islamabad, five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), as well as Afghanistan and Azerbaijan, were officially admitted to membership in the ECO.

Shemshad Ahmad, the secretary general of the ECO, at the conclusion of the Islamabad meeting, described this 10-sided "regional" grouping a nucleus of the formation of a large, 300-million-people Common Market. The member countries, by making a series of clear decisions, including decreasing trade tariffs, the creation of joint banking institutions, the establishment of the ECO airline company, and the establishment of satellite communications between the member countries, intend to pave the way for gradual advancement toward a regional common market.

The ECO is the heir of the "Regional Cooperation Development" (RCD), which was created on 29-30 Tir 1343 [20-21 Jul 1964] at the conference of the leaders of Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in Istanbul. In 1355 [21 Mar 1976-20 Mar 1977], the Ezmir Treaty clearly devised the legal and economic foundation of this organization. With the Islamic revolution in Iran, the activities of the "Regional Cooperation Development" organization were suspended, until in Bahman 1363 [21 Jan-19 Feb 1985], under the new name of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), once again reappeared on the scene. In Khordad 1369 [22 May-21 Jun 1990], the three countries signed the amending protocol of the Ezmir Treaty and raised the level of organization from the council of deputy ministers to the level of the council of ministers.

But the reappearance of the ECO on the regional level in fact began with the first meeting of the leaders of the member countries, which was held in Bahman 1370 [1992] in Tehran. For the countries in the region, nothing is more urgent and immediate than true cooperation both in the political and economic areas. In political terms, the stability of the region first depends on the borders not changing, which cannot be achieved except through a joint security system, which has ties to the international security systems. In the economic arena, the era of small national markets has ended forever, and an Economic Cooperation Organization will not achieve its goals unless it is able to prepare the grounds through the implementation of a series of clear steps for the gradual and long-term merging of the regional economies.

Observers of regional affairs say that the ECO in achieving its goals, in addition to the problems resulting from the economies of the member countries not being complementary, still faces great political obstacles. Among these obstacles is the two factors of Turkish chauvinism and Islamic fundamentalism are most noteworthy.

The next meeting of the foreign ministers of the 10 members of the ECO will be in February 1993 in Islamabad. Also, a meeting between the leaders of this organization is supposed to take place in Turkey next year.

Separate Seating Assigned to Men, Women on Buses

93AS0316F London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Dec 92 p 2

[Text] Even though years ago separate places were assigned to women and men on buses, the management of the Vahed Bus Company of Tehran decided this time, "in order to protect the lofty values of the revolution and Islam," to separate the entrance and exit doors and seating assignments of men and women on buses at any price. Also, women and men must form separate lines to board buses.

The above-mentioned regulations have been announced several times so far, but because of the excessive number of passengers, they were relaxed every time. Taxis were also instructed to avoid allowing women in the front seat, but there are so many practical problems resulting from this issue that they cannot be implemented. The Tehran Taxi Company is studying more practical ways to separate women from men in taxis. Also, the situation of "gender discrimination" on intercity rental buses and cars is still not clear.

Government Hospitals in Danger of Being Closed

93AS0316D London KEYHAN in Persian 10 Dec 92 p 1

[Text] Following the ratification of the urgency of the "legislative proposal to prohibit the increase in tariff and treatment costs" in the Majles, Dr. 'Ali Nowbakht, deputy minister of treatment in the Ministry of Health, Treatment and Medical Education of the Islamic Republic announced that if this proposal is ratified, the budget deficit of treatment sector of the Ministry will reach 200 billion tomans. He added: "With the ratification of this proposal, while the economic indexes and inflation rate increase, government hospitals will be on the verge of closure and will no longer be able to operate."

He also revealed, according to the new plan of the medical system organization, which has been submitted to the Cabinet for approval, the punishment for physicians who commit a violation in examination and treatment of patients has been set up to the level of permanent banning for the medical profession. The maximum punishment of physicians who commit a violation under the present regulations is three years deprivation of a medical profession.